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TAX HARMONY:
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE GLOBAL MINIMUM TAX
Reuven Avi-Yonah* and Young Ran (Christine) Kim†
43 MICHIGAN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2022)

Abstract
The rise of globalization has become a double-edged sword for countries
seeking to implement a beneficial tax policy. On one hand, there are increased
opportunities for attracting foreign capital and the benefits that increased jobs
and tax revenue brings to a society. However, there is also much more tax
competition among countries to attract foreign capital and investment. As tax
competition has grown, effective corporate tax rates have continued to be cut,
creating a “race-to-the-bottom” issue.
In 2021, 137 countries forming the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on
BEPS passed a major milestone in reforming international tax by successfully
introducing the framework of a global minimum corporate tax, known as
Pillar Two. It aims to set a floor for corporate tax rates with various corrective
measures so that multinational enterprises’ income will be taxed once in
either source country or residence country at a substantive tax rate. Hence,
Pillar Two is the first implementation of the “single tax principle” at the
global level. Because Pillar Two requires an unprecedented amount of
coordination among countries, it is important to understand Pillar Two
thoroughly so that countries can maneuver the challenges of implementation,
while still enjoying the ultimate benefit that would come from this global tax
harmony.
This Article analyzes the issues of tax competition and why most
countries in the world have come to the conclusion that a global minimum tax
is needed. This Article explains the single tax principle as theoretical
underpinning of Pillar Two, breaks down the principles and policies that
comprise Pillar Two, and anticipates what promise and pitfalls passage of the
global minimum tax will bring. Because the basis of Pillar Two is a direct
extension of the Global Intangible Low Tax Income (GILTI) and Base
Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act, it is reasonable to anticipate that the global minimum tax will be
considered a success if it is implemented by all the G20 countries.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 8, 2021, 136 countries signed the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(“BEPS”) statement (“the Statement”), which embodies the farthest-reaching
revolution in international taxation since the 1920s.1 The Statement marks the
beginning of a new international tax regime for the twenty-first century. Fit
for a modern, digital, globalized world, the Statement embraces the ideal of
corporate tax harmonization to combat the race to the bottom that has
dominated international taxation since the advent of globalization in the
1980s.2
This article will discuss the promises and pitfalls of the new international
tax regime, as embodied in Pillar Two of the Statement. The Statement
envisages this regime as built on two pillars. 3 Pillar One is focused on
expanding source country taxing rights on the income of large multinational
enterprises. In particular, it targets digital companies such as Facebook or
Google that are able to extract profits from a source jurisdiction without a
physical presence.4 We address Pillar One in a companion article, thus we
will not engage with it here.5
This article will discuss the circumstances that led to more than 130
jurisdictions around the world agreeing to implement the global minimum tax
and the single tax principle of Pillar Two. The double-edged sword of
globalization and tax competition created difficulties for many countries, as
they were being increasingly squeezed by multinational enterprises to provide
lower corporate tax rates and tax holidays as conditions for receiving foreign
investment. While increased foreign direct investment (“FDI”) can create
higher-paying job opportunities, economic growth, and the societal benefits
of an increased tax base, these benefits are greatly diminished when the
country needs to offer exceedingly low tax rates or tax holiday enticements
to secure the FDI.6 As tax competition has grown, global effective corporate
tax rates have continued to be cut, creating a “race-to-the-bottom” where the
1 Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. [“OECD”] (Oct. 8, 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-taxchallenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.pdf
[hereinafter,
Statement]. At first, 136 jurisdictions out of the 140 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive
Framework on BEPS joined the deal, the G20 finance ministers approved the agreement on
October 13, 2021, and the G20 leaders approved on October 31, 2021. G20 Leaders Confirm
Commitment to Global Tax Changes Under BEPS 2.0, EY TAX NEWS UPDATE (Nov. 2, 2021),
http://taxnews.ey.com/news/2021-1991-g20-leaders-confirm-commitment-to-global-taxchanges-under-beps-20. As of November 4, 2021, 137 countries and jurisdictions joined a new
two-pillar plan. OECD: BEPS, Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
2 The race to the bottom is a term to describe tax competition. This Article uses the two
terms interchangeably depending on the context.
3 Statement, supra note 1.
4 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Young Ran (Christine) Kim & Karen Sam, A New Framework
for Digital Taxation, 63 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
5 See id.
6 OPTIONS FOR LOW INCOME COUNTRIES’ EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF TAX
INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT, INT’L MONETARY FUND [“IMF”] (2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/101515.pdf.
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tax rate needed to attract foreign investment is so low that there is almost no
net benefit to the society securing the foreign capital.
Countries can address this problem by closing off their trade borders or
by making cutbacks to their social safety net.7 However, the better solution is
to limit tax competition.8 Pillar Two aims to address the issue of “race-to-thebottom” tax competition and achieve tax harmonization through the adoption
of a global minimum tax. Multinational enterprises that meet the €750 million
Euro revenue threshold—regardless of which jurisdiction they are
headquartered in or operate from—will be subject to a global minimum tax.9
But the way this new regime works is quite complex, because multinational
enterprises’ income involves at least two countries—the source country
where income is generated, and the residence country where investors are
located.
As an example, consider that Orange, a hypothetical U.S. multinational
enterprise, has a subsidiary corporation in Ireland.10 The Irish subsidiary’s
income from its trade or business is considered active income, and Ireland
(the source country) has primary jurisdiction to tax that income under the
benefits principle.11 Ideally, Ireland will tax the income at a substantive tax
rate. However, with the large negotiating power of massive multinational
enterprises, source countries do not always tax them at substantive rates.
Under Pillar Two’s global minimum tax, if the Irish subsidiary’s income is
taxed below the agreed minimum tax rate of fifteen percent in Ireland (the
source country), then the parent entity in the United States (the residence
country) is required to include such under-taxed income in its U.S. tax base
and pay the difference in additional taxes to the United States. If the United
States (the residence country) has not enacted Pillar Two’s income inclusion
rule as a corrective measure, then the Irish subsidiary’s tax deduction in
Ireland (the source country) would be denied. Alternatively, an equivalent
adjustment would be made to the extent that the low-tax income of the Irish
subsidiary is not subject to minimum tax under an income inclusion rule.
As illustrated in the example, the mechanics of Pillar Two can be quite
complicated. However, the objective of Pillar Two is clear: to implement the
goal of the single tax principle (that is, “full taxation”) in international tax,
thereby solving the problems created by the tax competition prevalent in the
7 See infra Part I.
8 See id.
9 Statement, supra note 1, at 4. Such a revenue threshold will be determined under Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Action 13 (country by country reporting), and a tax base
will be determined by reference to financial accounting income.
10 This hypothetical example is similar to Apple Inc.’s structure, which has been criticized
for avoiding taxes through its Irish subsidiaries. See, e.g., Simon Bowers, Apple’s Cash
Mountain, How It Avoids Tax, and the Irish Link, THE IRISH TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/apple-s-cash-mountain-how-it-avoids-tax-and-the-irishlink-1.3281734.
11 Under the benefits principle, active income from trade or business is primarily assigned
to the source country’s tax jurisdiction (and the residence country has secondary jurisdiction),
while passive income, such as dividends, interest, and royalty, is primarily assigned the
residence country’s tax jurisdiction (and the source country has secondary jurisdiction). This
principle is a product of the compromise among nations in 1923, driven by four economists in
the League of Nations. See infra Part II.A; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International
Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (1996).
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twentieth century. 12 The single tax principle requires multinational
enterprises’ income to be subject to taxation once. By doing so, it prevents
both double taxation and double non-taxation. However, there are nuances to
the single tax principle. First, the country (residence or source country) that
can exercise primary tax jurisdiction is determined based on whether income
is active or passive according to the benefits principle.13 With active income,
the source country has primary tax jurisdiction, and the residence country has
secondary jurisdiction. If taxation by the source country is substantial, the
residence country will yield its secondary taxing right by allowing a foreign
tax credit to prevent double taxation.14 On the other hand, if the first taxation
is nominal (below the minimum rate), it is not considered to have satisfied
the imposition of a “single tax,” and thus corrective rules by the secondary
tax jurisdiction should apply to prevent double non-taxation. Thus, the single
tax principle suggests that all income of multinationals must be taxed once at
a substantive tax rate. Hence, Ruth Mason refers to this principle as “full
taxation.”15
The single tax principle was first conceived of in the early twentieth
century as the basis for the foreign tax credit.16 The United States and other
countries began to practically implement the principle in the 1960s and
1970s. 17 However, until recently, it had not been fully integrated into
international tax because of fierce tax competition and many unilateral tax
policies that are inconsistent with the single tax principle.18 Many scholars
did not believe that reasonable tax harmony could be achieved through the
single tax principle, and thus, it had been somewhat controversial. 19
Nonetheless, the OECD BEPS 1.0 Project in the 2010s aspired to achieve the
single tax principle through global tax harmonization.20 Perhaps because of
lingering doubts about its feasibility, the project achieved limited success.21
The passage of the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) of 2017 played
a crucial role in establishing the feasibility of the single tax principle. The
TCJA adopted two new innovative breakthrough tax mechanisms: the Global
Intangible Low Tax Income (“GILTI”) rule for residence taxation and the

12 The single tax principle provides that corporate profits should be subject to a minimum
tax and that if the country with the primary right to tax such income (source or residence) does
not impose tax at the minimum level, the other country involved should tax it. For a discussion
of the single tax principle, see e.g., infra Part II.A.; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the
Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
305 (2015) [hereinafter, Single Tax Principle]. For full taxation, see Ruth Mason, The
Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353 (2020) [hereinafter,
Transformation].
13 For a discussion of the benefits principle, see supra note 11.
14 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (upholding a residence country’s obligation to prevent double
taxation by unilaterally granting foreign tax credits).
15 Transformation, supra note 12, at 22, 25.
16 See infra Part II.A.1.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See infra Part II.A.2.
20 See infra Part II.B.
21 See, e.g., Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21
FL. TAX REV. 1 (2017).
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Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”) rule for source taxation.22 These
two rules showed how the single tax principle can be achieved unilaterally to
combat base erosion and profit shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises. The
success of the TCJA also demonstrated conceptually that there are ways to
stop tax competition if the Group of Twenty (“G20”) countries implement the
single tax principle fully with proper corrective measures.23
Building upon those previous efforts, Pillar Two implements the single
tax principle globally for the first time by introducing a global minimum tax
rate of fifteen percent, and various corrective measures, such as the Income
Inclusion Rule (“IIR”) for residence taxation, and the Undertaxed Payment
Rule (“UTPR”) (denial of deduction) and Subject To Tax Rule (“STTR”) for
source taxation. 24 Unlike Pillar One, which requires changing more than
3,000 tax treaties with the participation of over 130 source jurisdictions, Pillar
Two can generally be implemented unilaterally through domestic legislation
with no changes to existing tax treaties.25 More importantly, Pillar Two only
requires cooperation by the G20, which are home to over ninety percent of
the world’s largest multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), because it offers
strong corrective measures exercised by residence countries. Pillar Two is
therefore more likely to be implemented than Pillar One. Also, the two pillars
deal with different problems—Pillar One with physical presence and source
taxation and Pillar Two with a global minimum tax and residence taxation—
and can conceptually be separated from each other.
The benefits that Pillar Two is expected to bring to the world are
significant. At a global minimum tax rate of fifteen percent, approximately
$150 billion U.S. dollars in additional global tax revenues will be generated
each year.26 The various corrective measures imposed on both source and
residence countries would reduce MNEs’ motivation to engage in base
erosion and profit shifting, because they would be paying a substantial “single
tax” no matter where they are located, or where their profits are attributed.27
Despite its promise, there are still some concerns about Pillar Two. The
fifteen percent global minimum tax rate is relatively low compared to the
average G20 corporate tax rate of about twenty-seven percent. 28 The
substance carve-outs in the Statement also raise concerns that Pillar Two may
still allow a certain level of tax competition.29 Also, there are concerns that,
22 The Global Intangible Low Tax Income (“GILTI”) rule imposed the U.S. tax as
residence taxation on certain foreign subsidiaries’ income from intangible assets, and Base
Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”) denies deductions in the U.S. as source taxation if the
deductible payments are unlikely to be subject to residence-based taxation. I.R.C. §§ 951A,
59A. See infra Part II.C.
23 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX
REV. 145, 175 (2019) [hereinafter, Taxing Tech].
24 See infra Part III.A.
25 See infra Part IV.B.3.
26 See infra Part IV.A.1.
27 See infra Part IV.A.2.
28 BEPS Monitoring Group Comments on the Model Rules for a Global Anti-BaseErosion Minimum Corporate Tax, 105 TAX NOTES INT’L 1421 (Mar. 21, 2022); Elke Asen,
Corporate Tax Rates Around the World, 2020, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2020),
http://taxfoundation.org/publications/corporate-tax-rates-around-the-world/. The average
corporate tax rate, as of 2020, for the G20 is 26.96 percent.
29 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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because Pillar Two gives the priority to residence taxation (via the IIR) over
source taxation (via the UTPR/STTR), it is skewed toward the interests of the
G20 countries over those of developing countries.30 Although there is some
truth to this critique, its significance depends on another question: are tax
holidays for FDI the result of a careful cost/benefit analysis by source
countries, or are tax holidays the result of pressure exerted by the MNEs and
the availability of other potential jurisdictions for investment? If the answer
is the latter, the critique is less convincing because the tax competition
problem can be solved by the IIR and residence taxation, which neutralize the
multinationals’ incentive to shop around the source countries for lower tax
rates.
This article is one of the first wave of comprehensive scholarly papers to
describe Pillar Two of the new international tax regime and to analyze its
theoretic underpinnings.31 Part I defines the tax competition problem Pillar
Two was designed to address. Part II presents the existing efforts to resolve
tax competition. It discusses the historical origins and development of the
single tax principle and explains the TCJA’s crucial role in leading to the
fruition of Pillar Two. Part III analyzes Pillar Two as a new solution to tax
competition. It highlights three rules in the Statement (the IIR, UTPR, and
STTR) and introduces the implementation plans by the OECD/G20 and the
United States in the Build Back Better (“BBB”) Act. Part IV addresses the
contribution, benefits, and potential challenges of Pillar Two. It concludes by
reflecting on how, in retrospect, Pillar Two fits in with the two principles
underlying the century-old regime, namely the benefits principle and the
single tax principle.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF TAX COMPETITION

The current age of globalization has made countries face the trilemma of
balancing (1) FDI-driven job creation and economic growth, (2) economic
openness and competition from peers, and (3) securing a social safety net.32
First, globalization has allowed many countries to utilize FDI to create more
and better-paying jobs for their citizens, 33 to generate investment in their
30 See infra Part IV.B.1.
31 See e.g., Jinyan Li, The Pillar 2 Undertaxed Payments Rule Departs from International
Consensus and Tax Treaties, 105 TAX NOTES INT’L 1401 (Mar. 21, 2022); Chris William
Sanchirico, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Global Minimum Tax Design (U of Penn, Inst for
Law & Econ Research Paper No. 22-19, 2022); Wei Cui, New Puzzles in International Tax
Agreements, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming).
32 On the importance of curbing tax competition to maintain democracy and the social
safety net under globalization, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000) [hereinafter, Tax
Competition]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State: A Twentieth Anniversary Retrospective, in THINKER, TEACHER, TRAVELER:
REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL TAX, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM 39 (Georg
Kofler, Ruth Mason & Alexander Rust eds., 2021).
33 Foreign Direct Investment “is a category of cross-border investment made by a resident
in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an
enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the
direct investor.” OECD, OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
17 (4th ed. 2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/2090148.pdf.
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economic infrastructure, and to introduce technologies that allow for
modernization. 34 The economic growth of Asian countries, such as
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, is believed to have been
primarily initiated by the influx of FDI in the 1950s. 35 These countries’
economies have since grown and flourished while the economies of other
nations who were similarly developing in the 1950s have stalled. Many would
attribute such contrast to these Asian countries’ ability and success in
attracting FDI.36
Second, a country that opens up its economy to FDI faces the risks that
come with a dependency on foreign capital that may be diverted elsewhere.
These risks come from competition from peer countries vying to attract
foreign capital to their economy. The epitome of such rivalry is “tax
competition,” which has been prevalent since the twentieth century.37 Many
developing countries who want to invite FDI to their soil offer a low tax rate
to foreign investors, such as overall low corporate tax rates, or tax holidays
where foreign investors are exempt from taxation for a predetermined period
of time.38 Such tax competition is harmful to developing countries, which
depend on corporate taxes to a much greater extent than developed
countries.39 On average, corporate tax accounts for approximately twentyfour percent of a developing country’s tax revenue, and only around eight
percent of a developed country’s tax revenue.40 This problem has worsened
as developed countries like Ireland have also begun engaging in tax
competition, putting even more downward pressure on corporate tax rates.
Ireland’s current corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent is much lower than the
OECD’s average corporate tax rate of 23.51 percent. 41 To compete,
developing countries may have to drop their rates even lower. Tax
competition creates an incentive to continue to lower tax rates or offer other
tax incentives to attract more FDI, potentially running these tax rates down to
the point where jurisdictions may receive little to no net revenue benefit from
the FDI. This “race-to-the-bottom” issue may not be apparent if one only
compares statutory tax rates by looking at countries’ published tax rate(s) for
corporate income, but if one looks at the rate foreign corporations are actually
34 See Yoram Y. Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth:
Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161 (2003).
35 See id. at 163.
36 Id. For different uses of tax incentives for FDI across countries, see IMF, supra note 6.
37 See, e.g., David Elkins, The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91
IND. L.J. 3 (2016).
38 Tax holiday refers to a government incentive program that offers a tax reduction or
elimination to businesses. See id.
39 See Ivan O. Ozai, Tax Competition and the Ethics of Burden Sharing, 42 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 61, 68 (2018).
40 Developed countries also have the benefit of their tax revenue from personal income
tax typically being three to four times more than their corporate tax revenues. See Avi Nov, The
“Bidding War” to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 835 (2006); Richard Bird, The Personal Income Tax, PREM NOTES: TAX POLICY
NO. 137, June 2001 at 1; Revenue Statistics 2021: Initial Impact of COVID-19 on OECD Tax
Revenues,
OECD
(2021),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/6e87f932en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/6e87f932-en.
41 Asen, supra note 28. Developed countries’ engagement in tax competition is especially
problematic because they are better able to absorb the negative aspects of creating tax incentives
while still gaining all the same benefits.
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paying—the effective tax rates—it is evident that poorer countries’ effective
tax rates were basically cut in half from 1996 to 2007.42
Third, a country also needs to maintain an adequate social safety net and
various welfare programs to protect its low-income population from poverty
and hardship. In the United States, the earned income tax credit, child tax
credits, and a cash transfer program called Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (“TANF”) are examples of this safety net.43 In Europe, these safety
nets can encompass all health care costs, education, and housing. Such large
safety nets require significant tax revenue, but countries reducing their
corporate tax rates or offering tax holidays in order to retain foreign investors
will find maintaining a robust social safety net much more difficult with a
revenue stream that is vulnerable to such downward fluctuations.44
Therefore, only two sides of the trilemma can be addressed
simultaneously. If a country is economically open, it must choose between
(1) attracting FDI, which requires tax competition and cuts to the social safety
net, and (2) losing FDI by foregoing tax competition and maintaining the
social safety net. If tax competition is inevitable in a globalized economy, a
country may then either (1) close up its economy, preserve its tax revenue,
and forego the benefits of globalization, or (2) open its economy, endure tax
competition, and subject the social safety net to potential volatility and cuts
even though it serves as a crucial buffer against the downsides of
globalization.
In fact, many European countries have reduced social safety net programs
following the financial crisis in 2008. 45 The United States retreated from
economic openness during the Trump administration. 46 However, neither
approach has been praised as a reasonable solution to the trilemma because
they are each destructive, requiring some fraction of the economy to sacrifice
or be worse off.47
Hence, the best solution to this trilemma is finding a way to productively
limit tax competition. Stopping destructive tax competition that races to the
bottom is a constructive way to solve the trilemma, and every country
involved would benefit. The problem, however, is that source countries
hosting FDI cannot curb tax competition unilaterally. If a country declares
that it will not engage in tax competition by offering tax incentives, such as
tax holidays, to MNEs, then these enterprises will invest elsewhere. For
example, when the Philippines declined to give a tax exemption and $15
million USD in tax incentives to General Motors, the FDI was diverted to
42 See Laura Abramovsky, Alexander Klem & David Phillips, Corporate Tax in
Developing Countries: Current Trends and Design Issues, 35 FISCAL STUD. 4 (2014)
(providing figure 1 at page 569 outlining trends in corporate income taxes in advanced and
developing economies and figure 2 at 570 tracking effective tax rates at different rates of
profitability).
43 See Earned I.R.C. § 32(a) (Earned Income Tax Credit); I.R.C. § 24(a) (Child Tax
Credits); 42 U.S.C. §§601–19 (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).
44 See, e.g., IMF, supra note 6, at 3.
45 See Marianne Bitler & Hilary Hoynes, The More Things Change, the More They Stay
the Same? The Safety New and Poverty in the Great Recession. 34 J. LAB. ECON. S403 (2016).
46 See Adam Posen, The Price of Nostalgia; America’s Self-Defeating Economic Retreat,
FOREIGN AFFS. (May 2021), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-0420/america-price-nostalgia.
47 See id.
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Thailand.48 The fundamental problem is that modern MNEs are exceedingly
mobile. They can be located in any country with adequate infrastructure and
an educated workforce. The geographic location of the investment does not
matter since intellectual property can be moved at no cost from one location
to another. The need of manufacturing facilities to be regularly updated or
retrofitted for new processes or innovations also serves to make moving to
new locations less cumbersome.
A common practice of MNEs is to assemble a list of countries that are
acceptable in terms of infrastructure and an educated workforce. The MNE
then approaches the government of each country and asks what it would
receive by way of tax breaks if it invested in the country. If confronted by a
refusal to compromise on taxes, the MNE threatens to go elsewhere, and few
politicians can resist the pressure of losing the favorable headlines that
accompany job creation by a major MNE.49
For example, Intel in the 1990s conducted an auction for its new source
country, pitting Ireland against Israel, and was able to obtain over $1 billion
USD in tax concessions from both countries. 50 More recently, Amazon
conducted an auction among U.S. localities to bid to become the locations of
its second headquarters, which ended up in the vicinity of Washington D.C.,
an area not lacking in development.51
The problem of tax competition is most acute in developing countries
because they depend more on corporate tax revenues than richer countries.
The percentage of total revenues from corporate tax in the OECD member
states is around seven to eight percent, but in developing countries it is closer
to twenty-four percent.52 Recognizing the negative impact of tax competition
on the global economy, the OECD issued the Harmful Tax Competition
Report in 1998 to address the problem.53 However, the problem remained
unaddressed, perhaps because it was unrealistic to expect that developed
countries would craft a solution to a problem that more seriously affects
developing countries.
Nevertheless, the harm from tax competition is not limited to developing
countries. Even the OECD member states suffer from the decline in corporate
tax revenues resulting from tax competition because they cannot raise other
taxes, which are already quite high.54 Instead, most OECD members had to
implement austerity measures that cut the social safety net in the wake of the
financial crisis of 2008, even though they understood the importance of the
social safety net for their citizens. For instance, Greece, one of the European
48 Gabriella Stern & Rebecca Blumenstein, GM May Locate Major Plant in Thailand, Not
Philippines,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
16,
1996),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB832194544528469500.
49 See Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, supra note 32, at 1645–46.
50 Id.
51 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Orli Avi-Yonah, Nir Fishbien & Hayian Xu, Federalizing Tax
Justice, 53 IND. L. REV. 479 (2020).
52 REVENUE STATISTICS BROCHURE INITIAL IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON OECD TAX
REVENUES, OECD (2021), http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-highlightsbrochure.pdf.
53 HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING ISSUE, OECD, (1998),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/1904176.pdf.
54 REVENUE STATISTICS BROCHURE INITIAL IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON OECD TAX
REVENUES, supra note 52, at 9.

10

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/223
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4102332

10

Avi-Yonah and Kim:

Union (“EU”) members hardest hit by the financial crisis, was faced with
either dramatically raising taxes or drastically curtailing public health
spending, and chose to cut spending, which resulted in understaffed and
underfunded hospitals and higher copays that drastically impacted vulnerable
groups.55 Similarly, the Netherlands’ financial shortfalls necessitated a move
to privatize insurance companies while Sweden switched many hospitals and
primary health care services over to the private sector in order to cut costs.56
These cuts of the social safety net were what led to the first BEPS Project of
the OECD in 2013–15.57 This BEPS 1.0 Project was designed to limit tax
competition by introducing various measures to prevent tax base erosion and
MNEs shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions.58
A major question regarding potential solutions to curbing tax
competition is whether they only address artificial profit shifting to low-tax
jurisdiction, such as tax havens, or also target real investment shopping
around the world. The OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition report from 1998
focused on artificial profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions, as did the BEPS
1.0 Project, which was based on the concept of “value creation.”59 Pillar One
of the global tax deal also focuses on artificial profit shifting. Pillar Two, on
the other hand, addresses both artificial profit shifting and real investment
shifting, although the latter is limited only by the substance carve-out
described in Parts III and IV.
II. EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO TAX COMPETITION
Destructive tax competition would disappear if the international tax
regime achieved tax harmony. The difficult part is how to achieve this
harmony. Having a uniform tax system across the globe would be the simplest
solution, but it is not realistic when each sovereign country has the ability and
right to develop their own tax systems. Consequently, an international tax
regime should offer a principle and framework that can systematically
prevent tax competition if countries agree to participate. This Part introduces
the single tax principle that we endorse and examines the existing efforts to
combat tax competition prior to the Statement and Pillar Two.
The Single Tax Principle, 1918 – 2015
The best solution to the problems created by tax competition is the single
tax principle, which requires that all income of MNEs be subject to taxation

55 See Elisavet Athanasia Alexiadou, Health Care Reforms and the Challenge of
Inequality From a Human Rights Lens: Lessons From Europe, 17 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 63
(2020).
56 Id. at 74.
57 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Great Recession and the International Tax Regime,
KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Apr. 23, 2019), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/04/23/the-greatrecession-and-the-international-tax-regime.
58 See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016);
Transformation, supra note 12, at 354.
59 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retrospective
After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783 (2009).
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once.60 However, there is nuance to the single tax principle. If the effective
tax rate for single taxation was nominal, then it would be an empty solution
to resolve tax competition. Thus, to make this principle effective, the single
tax principle accompanies a practical principle—that is, that all income of
MNEs be taxed once at a substantive tax rate, such as the average G20 tax
rate (currently around 26.96 percent). 61 If this proposition is not met,
corrective rules would need to apply to accomplish the result that MNEs’
income be taxed at a substantive rate.
The income of MNEs’ cross-border transactions involves more than one
country. Thus, the next issue stemming from the single tax principle is which
country should have primary jurisdiction to tax such income. The
international tax regime answers this question with the benefits principle. The
benefits principle was originally developed in 1923,62 under which: (1) active
income from trade or business is primarily assigned to the source country’s
tax jurisdiction (with the residence country having secondary jurisdiction),
and (2) passive income, such as dividends, interest, and royalties, is primarily
assigned to the residence country’s tax jurisdiction (with the source country
having secondary jurisdiction).63 MNEs’ corporate income from their trade
or business is considered active income, and thus, is primarily assigned to
source countries where such trade or business is conducted and income is
generated. Because of the primacy of source taxation for active income under
the benefits principle, residence countries of MNEs that have secondary tax
jurisdiction over such income should grant a foreign tax credit for source
taxes.64
However, the journey toward achieving the single tax principle
encountered challenges. Globalization in the late twentieth century resulted
in increased tax competition among source countries, which are mostly
developing countries with strong needs to lure FDI. Hence, source-based
taxation with a substantive tax rate was difficult to sustain. Furthermore, there
are too many source countries to be able to effectively cooperate to curb tax
competition.65
The single tax principle solves tax competition among source countries
by requiring a secondary tax jurisdiction to enforce the single tax principle at
a substantive tax rate if source-based taxation is nominal. Such nominal
source taxation should not count as a full “once” for the purposes of the single
tax principle. Ruth Mason (a Professor of Law and Taxation at the University

60 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle?: An Essay on the
History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2015).
61 See generally Asen, supra note 28. The rate of tax for the single tax principle is the
residence country’s tax rate for passive income (earned mostly by individuals) and the average
G20 source tax rate for active income (earned mostly by corporations).
62 THOMAS S. ADAMS, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION,
LECTURES ON TAXATION 101 (Roswell Magill ed., 1932).
63 Id.
64 See Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Response to International
Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89 (2004) (“Commitment to a single tax principle is in evidence
whenever a country relieves double taxation through a foreign tax credit and will not agree to
tax sparing.”); see also I.R.C. §§ 901, 903.
65 See Reuven Avi-Yonah and Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the
Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185 (2016).
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of Virginia School of Law) refers to this concept as “full taxation.”66 Under
the benefits principle, residence countries have secondary tax jurisdiction. If
residence countries exercise the secondary tax jurisdiction at a substantial tax
rate, the single tax principle can still be accomplished. This is relatively
straightforward to accomplish compared to an effort to curb source country
tax competition, because over ninety percent of the world’s largest
multinationals are residents of the G20.67
More importantly, if all residence countries exercise “full taxation”
power on MNEs’ global income, it would eliminate the problem of MNEs
shopping source countries by removing the incentive to do so.68 If an MNE’s
residence country is going to ensure that the MNE pays its full income tax
regardless of the country or tax haven where they claim to have “earned” the
income, there will be no economic benefit for MNEs to source country shop.
The Origins of the Single Tax Principle
The origins of the single tax principle can be traced back to the adoption
of the U.S. foreign tax credit in 1918. 69 Double taxation occurs in
international tax when a source country and residence country levy tax on the
same declared income. 70 Many countries enter into income tax treaties to
avoid such double taxation. Under such tax treaties, source countries offer
reduced withholding tax rates for aliens’ income from domestic sources,
whereas residence countries offer tax exemption or credit to foreign-source
income. 71 Thomas Adams, the U.S. Treasury advisor who introduced the
credit, stated that he rejected the exemption system used by most European
countries because it led to double non-taxation.72
The same formulation can be found in the commentary to the first model
tax treaty, issued under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1927, which
states as follows:
It is highly desirable that States should come to an agreement with a
view to ensuring that a taxpayer shall not be taxed on the same
income by a number of different countries, and it seems equally
66 Transformation, supra note 12, at 22, 25.
67 Role of the G20, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farmingfisheries/farming/international-cooperation/international-organisations/g20_en (last visited
Mar. 11, 2022); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, A Wealth Taxation on Corporations’ Stock,
G20
INSIGHTS
(2021),
http://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/a-wealth-tax-oncorporations-stock/ (“Corporations headquartered in the G20 represent over 90% of global
corporate equity market value.”).
68 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing
Multinationals, 5 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 137 (2016).
69 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60.
70 See Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 4 (1986).
71 See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 63 (4th
ed. 2011).
72 ADAMS, supra note 62, at 101, 112–13. For example, the first U.S. tax treaty with
France in 1932 abolished the United States withholding tax on royalties despite the fact that
France would not tax them, thereby creating certain double non-taxation in violation of the
single tax principle.
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desirable that such international cooperation should prevent certain
incomes from escaping taxation altogether. The most elementary and
undisputed principles of fiscal justice, therefore, required that the
experts should devise a scheme whereby all incomes would be taxed
once and only once.73
American tax policy began to change in the 1960s under the guidance of
Stanley Surrey, the first Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy and the true
intellectual father of the single tax principle. Surrey had publicly advocated
for the single tax principle in 1957 when he testified in the U.S. Senate against
a proposed United States-Pakistan tax treaty that provided for double nontaxation. 74 The treaty was not ratified. Surrey proposed imposing U.S.
taxation in full on all Controlled Foreign Companies (“CFCs”) 75 of U.S.
MNEs. Although Subpart F enacted in 1962 only applied the tax in situations
where the income was likely to escape source taxation,76 Surrey achieved his
main aim of generally imposing the single tax principle on U.S. MNEs.
Surrey also incorporated the single tax principle into U.S. tax treaties (for
example, the United States-Luxembourg tax treaty)77 by making it clear that
U.S. withholding taxes would not be reduced unless the income was subject
to tax in the residence jurisdiction.78 This provision was also included in the
first U.S. Model Tax Treaty of 1981.79
In the same year, however, the United States succumbed to the pressures
of globalization and the need to attract foreign investment by enacting the
portfolio interest exemption, which abolished the U.S. withholding tax on
portfolio interest regardless of whether it was taxed at the source.80 The rule
violated the single tax principle, but also led to massive capital flight into the
United States. It is one of the first examples of U.S. tax competition during

73 Reports Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85 1927 II (1927). The first model tax treaty also
included a provision imposing a withholding tax on interest, but provided that it would be
refunded if the taxpayer could show that the income was declared to her country of residence.
74 Joseph J. Thorndike, Stanley Surrey Knew a Thing or Two About Loopholes, TAX
ANALYSTS
ARTICLE
ARCHIVE
ONLINE
(Feb.
7,
2013),
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/05B6E5635C931F6F85257B160048DD4
D?OpenDocument.
75 I.R.C. §§ 957(a), 951, 952; Controlled Foreign Corporations (“CFCs”) are foreign
corporations in which more than fifty percent of the vote or value is owned by U.S. shareholders
who each own ten percent or more of the CFC.
76 I.R.C. §§ 951–65; The Subpart F provisions of the Internal Revenue Code eliminate
deferral of U.S. tax on some categories of foreign income by taxing certain U.S. persons
currently on their pro rata share of such income earned by their CFCs.
77 Income and Capital Tax Treaty, Lux.-U.S., art. XVI, Dec. 18, 1962,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/luxem.pdf.
78 This is the origin of the Subject to Tax Rule (“STTR”) in Pillar Two, discussed infra
Part III.A.2.
79 Single Tax Principle, supra note 12; Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, Stanley
Surrey, the 1981 US Model, and the Single Tax Principle, 49 INTERTAX 729 (2021). In 1984,
the United States terminated its treaties with tax havens such as the Netherlands Antilles because
they led to double non taxation in violation of the single tax principle.
80 I.R.C. § 871(h)(3); see Marilyn Franson, Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax
on Portfolio Interest Paid to Foreign Investors, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 3 (1984).
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globalization. 81 Furthermore, in the 1990s, Congress began weakening
Subpart F by adopting exceptions, such as for active banking and insurance,
even though the income was mobile and not taxed at the source.82
The erosion of the single tax principle culminated with the establishment
in 1997 of the “check the box” rule, which led to the complete undermining
of Subpart F, especially after it was codified in 2006.83 The “check the box”
rule enables U.S. MNEs to shift income from both the United States and hightax foreign countries to tax havens without triggering Subpart F.84 The result
of this erosion and violation of the single tax principle was that, by 2017, U.S.
MNEs had amassed more than $3 trillion USD of income in low-tax foreign
jurisdictions.85
Due to the increasingly intense and competitive nature of tax competition
between countries over the past twenty-five years, the first author of this
article, Reuven Avi-Yonah, has advocated for the single tax principle as a
solution to tax competition since 1997. 86 Income from cross-border
transactions should be subject to one-time taxation. However, taxing crossborder income just once also means care should be taken that it should not be
undertaxed. With this in mind, Avi-Yonah has argued that the appropriate
rate of tax for purposes of the single tax principle would be determined by the
second principle of international taxation, the benefits principle. That means
the active income should be taxed at least at the source tax rate (which tends
to be lower than the residence rate), but at no more than the residence rate.
As Part III demonstrates, the underlying idea behind Pillar Two can be
traced back to the concept of the single tax principle.87 Specifically, Pillar
81 Reuven Avi-Yonah, What Goes Around Comes Around: Why the USA is Responsible
for Capital Flight (and What It Can Do About It), 13 HAIFA L. REV. 321 (2019).
82 DAVID R. SICULAR, THE NEW LOOK-THROUGH RULE: W(H)ITHER SUBPART F? (Apr.
23, 2007), http://www.paulweiss.com/media/104725/SubPartF04-May-07.pdf.
83 A business entity may be treated as a pass-through entity (such as partnership or
disregarded entity) or a corporation for U.S. income tax purposes. Prior to the entity
classification regulations (also known as the “check-the-box”), an entity’s tax classification as
a corporation or flow-through entity was determined by a multifactor text. However, the checkthe-box regulations enacted in 1997 allow an eligible (i.e., not automatically classified as a
corporation) entity to elect to be classified as a corporate or a pass-through for U.S. income tax
purposes. I.R.C. § 7701; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2; see also SICULAR, supra note 82.
84 Id.
85 Richard Phillips, Matt Gardner, Alexandria Robins & Michelle Surka, Offshore Shell
Games
2017,
INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y
(Oct.
17,
2017),
http://itep.org/offshoreshellgames2017.
86 Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV.
507 (1997) [hereinafter, Electronic Commerce]. Avi-Yonah later developed a different
normative argument for the single tax principle, basing it for corporate taxation on the need to
curb the power of the largest multinationals. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society
and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2004); Reuven
Avi-Yonah, A New Corporate Tax, TAX NOTES FED. 653, 654 (2020).
87 This similarity has been noted by other scholars. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gil García, The
Single Tax Principle: Fiction or Reality in a Non-Comprehensive International Tax Regime?
11 WORLD TAX J. 497 (2019); Transformation, supra note 12, at 353 (“Because states already
faithfully adhered to the no-double-tax norm, growing acceptance of full taxation as a goal of
international tax brings states closer to implementing Avi-Yonah’s “single-tax principle.”);
Leopoldo Parada, Full Taxation: The Single Tax Emperor’s New Clothes, 24 FLA. TAX REV.
729 (2021) (identifying the BEPS 2.0 project (consisting of Pillars One and Two) as a modern
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Two offers various measures by which residual taxation by the residence (or
source) jurisdiction should occur when the tax imposed by the source (or
residence) jurisdiction falls below a specified level—that is, the global
minimum tax rate. Such mechanic embodies the idea of corrective measures
to prevent insufficient taxation as argued by the first author of this article in
support of the single tax principle.88
Academic Debate
Scholars and commentators have engaged in a long debate on whether
tax harmony or achieving the single tax principle would be possible in the
real world. H. David Rosenbloom of New York University, in his famous
Tillinghast Lecture in 1998,89 characterized international tax arbitrage as "the
deliberate exploitation of differences in national tax systems.” 90 To
Rosenbloom, international tax harmony was an unachievable ideal, whereas
tax competition and the resulting arbitrage was an inevitable by-product of
independent tax policymaking by sovereign states. Thus, preventing
mismatches in tax policy “is not and should not be a first-rank policy
objective of the United States.”91 Rosenbloom also identified line-drawing
problems related to distinguishing impermissible arbitrage from permissible
tax planning. Rosenbloom considered “international income” and the
“international tax system” to be imaginary, rejected the single tax principle,
and thus, argued that there was no principled objection to arbitrage.92
Academics, including the first author of this article, responded to
Rosenbloom’s critique by clarifying the policy concerns raised by
international tax competition and tax arbitrage and further detailing the
approach to the single tax principle); Wolfgang Schoen, Is There Finally an International Tax
System? in THINKER, TEACHER, TRAVELER: REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL TAX, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM 475 (Georg Kofler et al. eds., IBFD 2021) (“What can one
say about the “single tax principle”? Has it gained the status of a guiding and binding principle
of international tax law? Here, it is evident that the BEPS Action Plan adopted Avi-Yonah’s
findings to a large extent. International taxation – it claims – should ensure that income from
cross-border transactions is taxed exactly once – not more, not less.”).
88 Electronic Commerce, supra note 86, at 517.
89 H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage
and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 137 (2000) [hereinafter, Arbitrage];
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Commentary on Rosenbloom, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 167 (2000); Michael J.
Graetz, Taxing International Income - Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 335 (2001); DANIEL SHAVIRO, FIXING US
INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION
2
(2014),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-theoryworkshop/files/DShaviro.pdf; Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S61, S61 (2002); see Kane, supra note 64, at 92; Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime
in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 262–63. For a summary of the academic debate, see
Ruth Mason & Pascal Saint-Amans, Has Cross-Border Arbitrage Met Its Match?, in THINKER,
TEACHER, TRAVELER: REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL TAX. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF H. DAVID
ROSENBLOOM (Georg Kofler et al. eds., IBFD 2021), reprinted in 41 VA. TAX REV. 1, 10–11
(2021).
90 Arbitrage, supra note 89, at 166. Recently, the term “mismatches” has been more often
used to describe arbitrage.
91 H. David Rosenbloom, Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 85
TAXES 115, 116 (2007).
92 Id. at 115.
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efficiencies and benefits of the single tax principle.93 Adam Rosenzweig94
and Diane Ring95 argued that international tax competition and the resulting
arbitrage raised equity concerns because not everyone could benefit from it.
Daniel Shaviro, Mitchell Kane, Ring, and Rosenzweig highlighted the
efficiency concerns, arguing that tax competition and the resulting arbitrage
could cause various behavioral responses of taxpayers, such as distorting the
choice of location for investment.96
Some commentators were concerned about the interaction effect that
could arise from U.S. tax policy responses to arbitrage. Shaviro pointed out
that a unilateral response may cause retaliation by other countries.97 Kane
developed a model involving zero-sum tax competition among states seeking
to attract capital and argued that a state might exploit the ambiguity of
mismatching tax rules to win this competition without instigating retaliatory
responses.98 Omri Marian's study of the LuxLeaks rulings demonstrated how
the country Luxembourg was able to exploit the mismatches/arbitrages of tax
rules in such a way as to gain a significant economic advantage over its
neighboring states without attracting notice.99
Rosenbloom also pushed back on the notion that tax competition and
arbitrage was a threat to revenue. He argued that as long as the taxpayer
complies with each national tax regime, no one country has cause to complain
about revenue loss. 100 Kane and Rosenbloom rejected the conception of
hypothetical, collective income, or revenue that could have been available
had tax competition not existed. 101 However, the over 170 member
jurisdictions of the BEPS Inclusive Framework who signed on to the
Statement and Pillar Two clearly disagree.102
On a more direct challenge to the single tax principle, scholars have
raised concerns about what it means to tax only once.103 Shaviro suggests that
93 Avi-Yonah, supra note 89, at 170–71.
94 Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA.
TAX REV. 555, 564–65 (2007).
95 See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border
Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 125–28 (2002).
96 Daniel Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 317, 323–25 (2002); Kane, supra note 64, at 114; Ring, supra note 95, at 126–
27 (2002); Rosenzweig, supra note 94, at 564–65.
97 Shaviro, supra note 96, at 327.
98 Kane, supra note 64, at 142.
99 Until national legislators and the European Commission began to uncover the
Luxembourg's secret tax ruling practice to offer favorable tax treatment, there had been no
retaliation from other European Union (“EU”) countries because they simply did not know
about it. See Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2017).
100 Avi-Yonah, supra note 89, at 167.
101 Mason & Saint-Amans, supra note 89, at 5; see Kane, supra note 64, at 115 (arguing
that the acceptance of the single tax principle suggests that there is some international consensus
on the meaning of income, but no such consensus exists.).
102 OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE
ISSUES 11 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/hybrid-mismatcharrangements-tax-policy-and-compliance-issues.pdf ("Although it is often difficult to
determine which of countries involved has lost tax revenue [as a result of tax competition], it is
clear that collectively the countries concerned lose tax revenue.").
103 John Bentil, Situating the International Tax System Within Public International Law,
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being taxed twice at low rates (for example, two percent and two percent)
need not necessarily be worse than being taxed once (for example, five
percent).104 He further argues that the single tax principle would be hard to
operationalize despite higher levels of international cooperation because it is
“challenging to coordinate distinctive tax systems across multiple complex
dimensions” and, worse, countries have little interest in harmonizing their tax
rules.105
Nevertheless, recent developments, such as 137 Inclusive Framework
member jurisdictions agreeing to the two-Pillar solution—including the
global minimum tax in the Statement106—indicate that international interest
in tax harmony is not as outlandish as some scholars suggest.107 But the global
tax deal in the Statement was not built in a day. The next subpart further
explains the global reaction toward the single tax principle and tax harmony
prior to the creation of Pillar Two.
Global Efforts Begin in the Late 2000s
The recent international struggle in combatting tax competition is well
known among those in the field of international taxation. The first promising
step toward the single tax principle occurred in the context of tax information
transparency. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act of 2010 (“FATCA”) was enacted in the United States.108
FATCA was designed to stop the practice of U.S. residents pretending to be
foreigners in order to escape from U.S. taxation. 109 This practice enabled
double non-taxation of income hidden in offshore accounts, where such assets
were rarely detected because of bank secrecy. 110 Thus, FATCA required
foreign financial institutions, such as Swiss banks, to report accounts held by
U.S. residents and citizens to the U.S. government. 111 If foreign financial
institutions do not comply, they are subject to tax penalties and criminal
charges. FATCA’s major success directly led to the development of the
49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1219, 1251–52 (2018); see also Daniel Shaviro, The Two Faces of the Single
Tax Principle, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1293, 1294 (2016).
104 Shaviro, supra note 103, at 1294. However, this argument did not consider that taxing
once in the single tax principle has more nuance than just one count—that is, cross-border
income should be taxed once at a substantive tax rate.
105 Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent
International Tax Policy Developments, 69 TAX L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015).
106 Statement, supra note 1, at 4–5.
107 See Bentil, supra note 103, at 1251–52; Shaviro, supra note 96, at 330 (arguing the
STP would be difficult to operationalize despite increased levels of international cooperation
because “[s]hort of countries agreeing to harmonize their distinctive rules (which they appear
to have little interest in doing), it is quite challenging to coordinate all of the interactions
between distinctive systems across multiple complex dimensions.”).
108 See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad:
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 122 (2014).
109 To explain this concept more technically, U.S. residents pretend to be foreigners to
enjoy tax benefit from the portfolio interest exemption and other tax breaks for foreign portfolio
investment, such as the exemption of capital gains. For an explanation of FATCA generally,
see Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of FATCA,
20 FLA. TAX REV. 335, 359–62 (2017).
110 Id.
111 I.R.C. §§ 1471, 1472, 1473, 1474.

18

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/223
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4102332

18

Avi-Yonah and Kim:

Common Reporting Standard at the global level, which linked over 100
foreign jurisdictions in a system where they could automatically exchange tax
information with each other.112 The enhanced transparency in tax information
among countries can help achieve the single tax principle because it prevents
double non-taxation of passive investment income earned by individuals. It
is still not perfect (as evidenced by the recent leaks, such as the Pandora
Papers),113 but it is a significant step forward to full implementation of the
single tax principle.
Second, in recent years, many countries have been more willing to
cooperate and harmonize substantive tax rules to resolve tax competition.114
In Europe, the 2008 financial crisis led to massive austerity, which in turn put
pressure on politicians to raise concerns that MNEs (especially U.S. MNEs)
were not paying their fair share of tax to Europe as a source jurisdiction.115
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, realized that
traditional international tax rules with a physical presence requirement did
not allow them to tax Big Tech despite the fact that those companies collected
and profited from the user data of their citizens.116 Thus, they adopted digital
services taxes (“DSTs”). 117 This move caused heated debate around the
world, leading the OECD to launch BEPS Project 1.0 to try to update the
international tax regime that overlooked under-taxation of the digital
economy and to prevent trade wars over individually-enacted DSTs.118
Through these efforts, countries realized that a complete harmonization
of substantive tax law was unlikely to be fully successful as a comprehensive
solution to tax competition because individual states would be reluctant to
defer to another states' underlying tax rules, or agree to implement a common
set of rules for harmonization that may not match their tax objectives.119 An
alternative to harmonization that states have pursued recently are conditional
rules.120 Mason explains these conditional rules as “fiscal fail-safe” measures
to guarantee full taxation and implement the single tax principle.121 In other
112 See id.
113 See The Pandora Papers: An ICIJ Investigation, INT’L CONSORTIUM INDEP.
JOURNALISTS http://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
The Pandora Papers are 11.9 million leaked documents that the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists published that exposed the secret offshore accounts of thirty-five world
leaders as well as more than 100 billionaires, celebrities and business leaders
114 See OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
115 See Schreuer Rappepert & Singer Tankersley, Europe’s Planned Digital Tax
Heightens Tensions with US, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2018, at 1–2,
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/politics/europe-digital-tax-trade.html.
116 Id. at 3–4.
117 See e.g., Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-border Variation
of the Consumption Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 136 (2020).
118 OECD, supra note 114.
119 See e.g., Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 974,
976–77 (2016).
120 See Transformation, supra note 12, at 378–79. Mason offers two examples of
conditional rules: penalty defaults and fiscal fail-safes. Penalty defaults may be set up in tax
law and treaties if states do not resolve tax ambiguities against the taxpayer. Rules that deny
tax-treaty benefits to fiscally transparent entities could be understood as penalty defaults. Fiscal
fail safes are explained in the above text.
121 Id. at 374–75.
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words, the conditional or secondary rules attempt to ensure that cross-border
income does not escape tax by identifying "conditions under which, if one
country does not tax, another country fills the tax void."122 These conditional
rules emerged in the BEPS Project 1.0, such as in Action 3 for expanding the
CFC regimes123 and Action 2 for anti-hybrid rules.124 The BEPS Project 2.0
Pillar Two for a global minimum tax is also built on this conditional, fiscal
fail-safe rules as demonstrated in Part III.A. 125 Although not extensively
harmonious because of various carve-outs and specific exceptions that
various countries demanded, the examples reflect a new willingness to
cooperatively coordinate efforts to address international tax arbitrage in a
more comprehensive way.
On reflection, BEPS Project 1.0 included some significant steps toward
tax harmony and the single tax principle. BEPS Project 1.0 is contrary to
Rosenbloom's preferred solution of acquiescing to tax competition and
arbitrage, which is doing nothing, because he did not believe there was a
problem to solve. However, while this Project advanced the single tax
principle, most of its actions have been recommendations, not requirements,
and for the most part its recommendations went unimplemented throughout
the world. However, the EU did adopt various action items of BEPS Project
1.0 through its own directives, such as the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
(“ATAD”).126 But such a regional approach is limited in its ability to advance
the single tax principle because of the need for global harmonization. BEPS
Project 1.0 was disappointing because it did not fully implement the single
tax principle on any meaningful scale or update the international tax regime
for the twenty-first century.127
The shortcomings of BEPS Project 1.0 were addressed in BEPS Project
2.0. The new project developed a plan for international taxation that
addressed the most pressing concerns in the plan’s two Pillars. However, the
impetus of the plan did not come from the EU or any other multilateral
agreement – it was a direct result of the passage of the TCJA. The next subpart
discusses the important provisions of the TCJA that inspired BEPS Project.
2.0.
The TCJA as Constructive Unilateralism
The United States has a long history of unilaterally adopting tax policies
that are later enacted by many other countries around the world. This risktaking on the part of the United States is considered by many to be
122 Id. at 381.
123 OECD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES, ACTION 3
– 2015 FINAL REPORT 12 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241152-en.
124 OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS,
ACTION 2 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 49–50 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241138-en.
125 See infra Part III.A.
126 Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, BEPS, ATAP and the New Tax Dialogue: A
Transatlantic Competition? 46 INTERTAX 885, 885 (2018).
127 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Full Circle: The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and the New US
Model, 1 GLOBAL TAX’N 12, 12 (2016) (criticizing BEPS Project 1.0 for not changing the
obsolete physical presence requirement in tax treaties and limiting the unworkable arm’s length
standard for transfer pricing).
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internationally constructive because it allows other jurisdictions to evaluate
the effectiveness of a tax policy before implementation.128 Most notably, the
United States has led the way with the Foreign Tax Credit, CFCs, and the two
international tax rules in the TCJA—GILTI and BEAT, discussed in more
detail below.129
Passage of the TCJA was not primarily motivated by a desire to
implement the single tax principle. Instead, the U.S. government wanted to
bring back and tax the nearly $3 trillion USD of offshore corporate profits of
the U.S. MNEs. 130 Before the TCJA, U.S. parent companies with foreign
subsidiaries were generally not taxed on the earnings of their subsidiaries
until the earnings were distributed to them (or repatriated to the United
States).131 If the foreign corporation did not distribute earnings back to the
United States, U.S. parents could indefinitely defer paying U.S. taxes at the
thirty-five percent rate on this foreign income.132 As a result, U.S. MNEs,
such as Apple, could incorporate a subsidiary in tax havens or low-tax
jurisdictions like Ireland (where the corporate tax rate is 12.5 percent) and
allocate as much taxable income as possible to these low-tax jurisdictions in
order to minimize U.S. corporate income tax.133 Between 2005 and 2017,
U.S. MNEs had accumulated $2.6 trillion USD of low-taxed foreign income
offshore that had never been subject to the thirty-five percent corporate
income tax rate.134 Thus, one of the primary goals of the TCJA was to remove
potential tax benefits from offshoring income, thus returning the $2.6 trillion
USD in capital to the United States for taxation and deterring such profitshifting activity in the future.135
At the same time, other corporations whose businesses are more focused
on the domestic market, such as Walmart, lobbied to reduce the thirty-five
percent corporate tax rate, while owners of pass-through entities (like thenPresident Trump) pushed for a reduction of the tax rate on partnerships.136
128 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Constructive Dialogue: BEPA and the TCJA 2 (Univ. Mich. Pub.
L. Rsch. Paper No. 665, 2020), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544065.).
129 Id. at 2, 4, 16.
130 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Provisions of the TCJA: A Preliminary
Summary and Assessment, (Univ. Mich. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 605, 2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3193278.
131 Id.
132 Upon repatriation of earnings from a foreign subsidiary, U.S. corporate shareholders’
earnings were treated as dividends that were included in the parent corporation’s income and
were subject to U.S. taxation at a rate of up to thirty-five percent with a foreign tax credit based
on foreign taxes paid.
133 For example, in a recent high-profile tax case, the European Commission demanded
that Apple pay Ireland €13.1 billion Euros in underpaid taxes because Ireland granted state aid
to the company. Padraic Halpin, Ireland Collects Disputed Apple Taxes in Full ahead of Appeal,
REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2018, 8:55 AM), http://reut.rs/38wQSLQ.
134 Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. (last updated May 2020),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-tcja-repatriation-tax-and-how-does-itwork.
135 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 130.
136 See John Ydstie, How Trump's Corporate Tax Cut Is Playing Out for Wal-Mart, NPR
(Jan. 13, 2018, 5:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/2018/01/13/577900650/how-trump-s-corporatetax-cut-is-playing-out-with-wal-mart; see also Reuven Avi-Yonah, How Terrible is the New
Tax Law? Reflections on TRA17, (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 586, 2018),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095830.
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The result was the TCJA. The TCJA implemented a participation
exemption for dividends from CFCs,137 cut the corporate tax rate from thirtyfive percent to twenty-one percent,138 and cut the partnership and other passthrough tax rate from thirty-seven percent to 29.6 percent.139 However, to pay
for all these tax cuts within the confines of Budget Reconciliation, the
Republican members of Congress decided to apply the single tax principle to
U.S. MNEs to stop their base erosion and profit-shifting strategies that have
harmed U.S. revenue.140
Three important provisions of the TCJA represented steps toward the
single tax principle. First is the one-time mandatory “repatriation tax”
(sometimes referred to “transition tax”). A significant tax rate (between eight
and fifteen percent) was imposed on the past accumulated offshore profits of
U.S. MNEs.141 It was imposed only one time, and it did not matter whether
those offshore profits were repatriated to the United States.142 Those profits
were parked in low-tax jurisdictions, resulting in nominal source taxation.
They were not subject to residence taxation by the United States because the
pre-TCJA tax law allowed the U.S. MNEs to defer taxation until the profits
were repatriated.143 Hence, the new temporary repatriation tax in the TCJA
implemented the single tax principle because these profits were previously
subject to double non-taxation through the “check the box” policy.
Second, the GILTI rule imposed a tax on certain foreign subsidiaries’
income from intangible assets. 144 Although the TCJA lowered the top
corporate income tax rate from thirty-five percent to a flat twenty-one
percent, the U.S. corporate tax rate still exceeds the rate in many countries.145
Thus, situating ownership of a profitable patent, for example, in a foreign
subsidiary in a lower-rate or no-tax jurisdiction instead of in the United States
still could produce a substantial tax savings for an MNE. GILTI aims to
prevent such profit shifting from easily movable intangible assets by
imposing the U.S. tax as residence taxation on foreign-source income from
intangibles.146 GILTI is foreign income earned by U.S. shareholders of CFCs
from intangible assets, such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents. It is
137 Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), U.S. taxpayers were subject to U.S.
income taxes on their worldwide income. But income earned by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations was subject to tax only when repatriated to the United States as dividends. The
TCJA changed the tax rules for multinational corporations by generally exempting the earnings
of foreign subsidiaries’ active businesses from U.S. corporate taxation, even if repatriated.
Technically, there now is a 100 percent dividend-received deduction. This is called
“participation exemption.” I.R.C. § 245A.
138 I.R.C. § 11.
139 I.R.C. § 199A.
140 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 136, at 5–6.
141 I.R.C. § 965.
142 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The International Provisions of the TCJA: Six Results After
Six Months (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 621, 2018),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3242008.
143 U.S. multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) deployed complicated corporate structures
with the check-the-box rule so that they could defer the U.S. taxation until the offshore profits
were repatriated, which rarely happened.
144 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 142.
145 Id.
146 Id.; Avi-Yonah, The Baby and the Bathwater: Reflections on the TCJA’s International
Provisions, 101 TAX NOTES INT'L 599 (Feb. 1, 2021).
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calculated as the total active income earned by a CFC that exceeds ten percent
of the firm’s depreciable tangible property (known as the Qualified Business
Asset Investment, or “QBAI”). The resulting U.S. shareholders who own ten
percent or more of a CFC are liable for the tax on its GILTI, which generally
applies at a rate between 10.5 percent and 13.125 percent.147 GILTI is perhaps
the most successful and influential achievement of the single tax principle
contained within the TCJA. Income subject to the GILTI rule would be
subject to little-to-no tax in source and otherwise not be subject to U.S.
residence taxation. The exclusion for offshore tangible assets returns (the
QBAI exemption) may tarnish the purpose of GILTI, but it is unlikely to be
a major drawback because the largest U.S. MNEs had few tangible assets
offshore.148
Finally, the BEAT provision addressed the problem of base erosion by
foreign MNEs.149 Suppose that a U.S. corporation pays deductible payments,
such as interest and royalties, to a related foreign entity. From the foreign
entity’s perspective, such interest and royalties are U.S. source income. But
suppose further that the foreign entity is not subject to U.S. withholding tax
for various reasons, such as tax treaty benefits and statutory tax exemptions.
This is a classic example of multinationals escaping source-based taxation (in
this case, U.S. taxation) by accumulating large amounts of deductible
payments offshore. Neither the U.S. corporation nor the foreign recipient pay
tax to the source country. To avoid such base-erosion payment, the BEAT
reverses deductions and imposes an alternative minimum tax set at ten percent
(12.5 percent from 2026) on the modified tax base of the U.S. corporation.150
The BEAT was enacted despite potentially violating the non-discrimination
provision of all U.S. tax treaties because the rule applies to the case of “U.S.
subsidiary-foreign parent” but not the case of “U.S. subsidiary-U.S.
parent.” 151 Nonetheless, BEAT effectively denies deductions in source
countries for payments that are unlikely to be subject to residence-based
taxation. BEAT achieves the single tax principle by strengthening sourcebased taxation.
The TCJA, albeit begrudgingly, moved the United States toward the
single tax principle and combating tax competition. The global result was
remarkably constructive, as the TCJA demonstrated a means to feasibly
achieve reasonable tax harmonization. Inspired by the international tax
provisions of the TCJA, the G20 and the OECD launched BEPS Project 2.0
in 2017, using GILTI and BEAT as the models for its Pillar Two proposal.
147 I.R.C. § 951A. Under current law, GILTI is defined as net foreign income after a
deduction for 10 ten percent of the value of foreign tangible assets. Half of GILTI is taxed at
the U.S. corporate rate of twenty one percent, which means the basic rate on GILTI is 10.5%.
If a company pays foreign taxes, it can claim eighty percent of the value of those taxes as a
credit against GILTI liability. Taking this foreign tax credit policy into account means the tax
rate on GILTI moves up to 13.125%.
148 This also meant that the new participation exemption in the TCJA violates the single
tax principle, but it is unlikely to benefit the multinationals much.
149 I.R.C. § 59A.
150 Id.
151 A tax treaty’s non-discrimination provision promises to treat nationals of one country
that is party to the tax treaty the same as nationals of the source country that is party to the tax
treaty if both sets of nationals are in the same circumstance. Under BEAT, it is possible that
two corporations in the same circumstance could be treated differently.
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Pillar One of the Statement focuses on updating outdated rules in sourcebased taxation.152 Pillar Two is more directly on point for implementing the
single tax principle through a combination of rules strengthening residencebased taxation (for example, the IIR) and source-based taxation (UTPR and
STTR). The benchmark of “substantial tax” counted “once” for single tax
purposes is set at fifteen percent, the global minimum tax. Part III will discuss
Pillar Two in greater detail.
III. A NEW SOLUTION: PILLAR TWO AND GLOBAL MINIMUM TAX
The Statement presents Pillar Two and the global minimum tax as a new
solution to tax competition. Together with Pillar One, the entire framework
in the Statement represents a revolution in international taxation by offering
many solutions, such as eliminating the obsolete permanent establishment
requirement for Amount A in Pillar One and proposing a fifteen percent
global minimum tax in Pillar Two. All of these are decisive breaks from the
past, and have been suggested for twenty-five years but have gained little
traction until now.153 Thus, the Statement encompasses both revolution and
evolution.
This Part focuses on Pillar Two of the Statement. Pillar Two is a new
solution to tax competition. It is aimed at systematically preventing the race
to the bottom and eliminating incentives for both states and MNEs to engage
in tax competition. However, this novel solution builds upon past efforts. This
article argues that Pillar Two has finally embodied the single tax principle
which states that all income of MNEs ought to be taxed once at a substantive
tax rate. If this proposition is not met, corrective rules apply to accomplish
the result. This Part explains the details of Pillar Two and the relevant
implementation rules, such as the proposed BBB Act of the United States.
The rules are very technical and complex. Evaluating these rules through the
lens of the single tax principle—that all income must be taxed once
substantially—will help readers understand the rules intuitively if the
technicalities overwhelm.
Unpacking Pillar Two
Pillar Two consists of (1) two interlocking domestic rules requiring
income inclusion (for residence countries (IIR) and denial of deduction for
source countries (UTPR), together referred to as the Global anti-Base Erosion
(“GLoBE”) Rules, and (2) a treaty-based rule (STTR).
Domestic Rules: Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GloBE”) Rules
GloBE Rules, have two components: income inclusion (IIR) and denial
152 Pillar One focuses on source-based taxation and finally partially abolishes the obsolete
physical presence requirement and the arm’s length standard for some of the profits of large
multinationals above a fixed return on assets. See Avi-Yonah, Kim & Sam, supra note 4.
153 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The New International Tax Framework: Evolution or
Revolution?,
25
AM.
SOC'Y
INT'L
L.
11
(2021),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/11.
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of deduction (UTPR). MNEs that meet the €750 million Euros revenue
threshold determined under BEPS Action 13 (country-by-country reporting)
are subject to a global minimum tax regardless of the jurisdiction where they
are headquartered or operating.154 Also, the Statement makes it clear that the
U.S. GILTI regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules.155
First, the IIR requires the residence countries of multinational
corporations to impose top-up tax156 on an ultimate parent entity (“UPE”) at
a minimum rate of fifteen percent if the source country where a subsidiary
operates imposes tax below such minimum rate on the subsidiary’s income.
The fifteen percent global minimum tax rate is an effective rate, not a nominal
rate.157 The IIR allocates top-up tax based on a top-down approach subject to
a split-ownership rule for shareholdings below eighty percent.158 With the
single tax principle in mind, this rule acts as a corrective measure that allows
residence countries to tax if source taxation is not substantial enough to count
“once.”
Second, if a residence country does not impose this minimum tax, the
subsidiary’s deduction for payment to the parent entity would be denied or an
equivalent adjustment would be required as per the UTPR to the extent that
the low tax income of a subsidiary is not subject to tax under an IIR.159 This
represents an additional corrective measure to guarantee substantial source
taxation if residence countries do not cooperate.
To illustrate, suppose that a subsidiary in the source country earns $100
USD of income and the source country imposes tax at ten percent, which is
below the fifteen percent global minimum tax rate. Then, the residence
country of the parent entity includes the $100 USD in the parent’s income
and imposes tax at a rate that is equal to the difference between the fifteen
percent of global minimum rate and the said ten percent tax rate. Suppose
further that the subsidiary pays the $100 USD to the parent in a deductible
form, such as a royalty. If the residence country does not have the IIR, the
subsidiary’s deduction for the $100 USD royalty payment will be denied.
Pascal Saint-Amans, the director of the OECD's Center for Tax Policy
and Administration, explains that the UTPR is intended as an insurance policy

154 Statement, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that government entities, international
organizations, non-profit organizations, pension funds or investment funds that are Ultimate
Parent Entities (“UPE”) of an MNE Group or any holding vehicles used by such entities,
organizations or funds are not subject to the Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GloBE”) rules).
155 Id. at 5.
156 A top-up tax allows the residence country to tax the difference between the applicable
tax rate in a particular country up to the agreed global minimum tax rate. David Lawder & Leigh
Thomas, Explainer: What is a Global Minimum Tax and How Could it Affect Companies,
Countries? REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2021, 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/business/what-isglobal-minimum-tax-how-could-it-affect-companies-countries-2021-04-14. For example, if a
country only taxed at eleven percent, the residence country could tax the difference of four
percent to ensure the fifteen percent global minimum was achieved.
157 Statement, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that this effective tax rate is calculated on a
jurisdictional basis and uses a common definition of covered taxes and tax a tax base determined
by reference to financial accounting income).
158 Id.
159 Id at 3.
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against countries that refuse to implement Pillar Two.160 If companies move
to non-cooperating jurisdictions in hope of gaining a tax advantage, the effect
would be fully neutralized. However, certain MNEs will not be subject to the
undertaxed payment rule for the first five years after meeting the €750 million
Euros revenue threshold if their foreign tangible assets do not exceed €50
million Euros and they operate in no more than five foreign countries.161
There are important carve-outs to the GloBE rules. 162 First, the
substance-based carve-out of income from the Pillar Two rules will exempt,
in the first year, eight percent of the carrying value of tangible assets and ten
percent of payroll. These percentages will decline by 0.2 percent each year
for the next five years, and by 0.4 percent (for tangible assets) and 0.8 percent
(for payroll) each year for the subsequent five years, after which the
exemption will be five percent of both tangible assets and payroll. Second, a
de minimis carve-out will exclude profits from countries where the MNE has
less than €10 million Euros in revenue and less than €1 million Euros in
profits. The Statement offers that there will be further carve-outs, such as safe
harbors, in the implementation documents.163 These substantial carve-outs
harm the spirit of the single tax principle, and infra Part IV.B.2 discusses their
pitfalls.
Treaty-Based Rule: Subject to Tax Rule (“STTR”)
The STTR is a standalone treaty rule whose origin can be traced back to
Stanley Surrey’s U.S. tax treaty policy in the 1960s, discussed in Part II.A.1.
It specifically targets intercompany payments that exploit treaties to shift
profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 164 Therefore, this rule applies to certain
categories of deductible payments that present a greater risk of base erosion,
such as interest and royalties. 165 There were negotiations by the Inclusive
Framework regarding the minimum rate for STTR, between 7.5 percent and
nine percent,166 however, the Statement stipulates that the minimum rate will
be nine percent.167
For example, suppose that a subsidiary in the source country pays a
royalty to a parent company of $100 USD, and the parent’s $100 USD royalty
160 Alex Parker, How the Global Tax Agreement Could Backfire for Biden, LAW360 (Oct.
18,
2021),
http://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1431269/how-the-global-taxagreement-could-backfire-for-biden.
161 Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
162 In addition to the two carve-outs in the text above, international shipping income is
excluded from the GloBE rules. Statement, supra note 1, at 5.
163 Id. at 4–5.
164 OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - REPORT ON PILLAR
TWO BLUEPRINT: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT 150, ¶ 566 (2020), http://doi.org/10.1787/abb4c3d1-en [hereinafter, PILLAR
TWO BLUEPRINT].
165 Id. at 150, ¶ 568.
166 OECD, STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 5 (July 1, 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-taxchallenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf [hereinafter JULY
STATEMENT].
167 Statement, supra note 1, at 5.
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income is subject to a nominal tax rate of one percent below the minimum
rate (nine percent) in the residence country. Then, the source country is
allowed to impose withholding tax on the royalty payment at a rate that is
equal to the difference between the minimum rate provided for under the
STTR (nine percent) and the said nominal tax rate (one percent).168
Model Rules
The Statement provides, “[p]illar Two should be brought into law in
2022, to be effective in 2023, with the UTPR coming into effect in 2024.”169
The OECD/Inclusive Framework will present Model Rules for Pillar Two to
define the scope and mechanics of the GloBE rules and provide a template
for domestic legislation to implement the GloBE regime. The
OECD/Inclusive Framework will also provide model treaty provisions to give
effect to the STTR by mid-2022.170 At the end of 2022, the OECD expects to
have an implementation framework to facilitate the coordinated
implementation of the GloBE rules.171
In December 2021, the OCED/Inclusive Framework released Model
Rules for Pillar Two, consisting of ten chapters that explained the GloBE
regime in detail. 172 In addition to this seventy-page document, the
OECD/Inclusive Framework distributed Commentary to the Model Rules
(Pillar Two) later in March 2022, which is about 230 pages long. There are
multiple supplements issued by the OECD/Inclusive Framework,173 but the
authors found the six-page fact sheets most helpful for many readers.174
Figure 1. Top-up Tax Explained175

168 PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT, supra note 164, at 165, ¶ 650.
169 Statement, supra note 1, at 5.
170 GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION MODEL RULES (PILLAR TWO), FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, OECD 6 (Dec. 2021). The model treaty provisions were supposed to be released
in November 2021, but the released was delayed to mid-2022.
171 Id.
172 TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY – GLOBAL
ANTI-BASE EROSION MODEL RULES (PILLAR TWO), OECD (Dec. 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-theeconomyglobal-anti-base-erosion-model-rules-pillar-two.htm [hereinafter, Model Rules]. Chapter 1
addresses questions of the GloBE scope. Chapters 2–5 contain the key operative rules. Chapter
6 deals with mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 7 provides special rules that apply to certain tax
neutrality and existing distribution tax regimes. Chapter 8 deals with administration, Chapter 9
provides for rules on transition and Chapter 10 contains definitions. Id. at 7.
173 See e.g., THE PILLAR TWO RULES IN A NUTSHELL, OECD (Dec. 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/pillar-two-model-rules-in-a-nutshell.pdf; OVERVIEW OF THE
KEY OPERATING PROVISIONS OF THE GLOBE RULES, OECD (Dec. 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/pillar-two-GloBE-rules-fact-sheets.pdf (referred to as “fact
sheets” in the file name assigned by the OECD).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1.
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First, the Model Rules explain what “top-up tax” means in Pillar Two.
As Figure 1 shows, top-up tax first assumes a minimum tax amount relating
to the MNE’s excess profit calculated at the minimum tax rate of fifteen
percent. If certain Covered Taxes (in Step 3 below) paid by constituent
entities of the MNE do not reach the minimum tax amount, the GloBE Rules
will impose an additional tax to fill the deficient tax amount. So, the top-up
tax seems to describe the tax rules that pull the top of the tax liability amount
up to a certain minimum level.
To determine top-up tax liability for an MNE, the Model Rules offer five
steps:176
• Step 1: An MNE Group determines whether it is within the scope
of the GloBE rules. If so, it identifies the location of each
Constituent Entity within the MNE Group.
• Step 2: The MNE Group determines income of each constituent
entity. This so-called GloBE Income of a constituent entity is the
income used for preparing a consolidated financial statement of the
ultimate parent entity.177
• Step 3: The MNE Group determines taxes attributable to income
determined in Step 2. (Covered Taxes)
• Step 4: The MNE Group calculates the effective tax rate of all
Constituent Entities located in the same jurisdiction. If an MNE is
subject to an effective tax rate below fifteen percent in any
jurisdiction, calculate the top-up tax with respect to that low tax
jurisdiction.
• Step 5: The MNE Group is liable to the so-impose top-up tax under
IIR in the residence country or UTPR in the source country in
accordance with the agreed rule order.178
The initial and overwhelming responses from MNEs are that the Model
Rules are so complex that they need to be simplified.179 For example, Step 4
176 Id.
177 Model Rules, supra note 172, at 15, art. 3.1.
178 Jinyan Li makes a noteworthy observation on the Model Rules’ revised approach on
the UTPR. See Li, supra note 31 (explaining that the UTPR is similar to the U.S. BEAT rule as
an anti-base-erosion rule with respect to MNEs’ intragroup payments. But the Model Rule
removes the link to intragroup payments and makes the UTPR a modified formulary
apportionment to share tax base among countries. Li concludes that such modified approach
departs from the international consensus on the original version of Pillar Two UTPR and may
be incompatible with tax treaties.).
179 See e.g., Isabel Gottlieb, Companies Eager to See Details on Minimum Tax
Simplifications, BLOOMBERG TAX (Mar. 23, 2022), http://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-
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requires MNEs to calculate their effective tax rate in each jurisdiction where
they do business. It is a novel compliance challenge that requires MNEs to
prepare new information systems.180 The OECD/Inclusive Framework also
acknowledges the challenges, so the OECD/Inclusive Framework promises
to develop safe harbors that let MNEs avoid full calculations of top-up tax in
certain circumstances. 181 However, the Model Rules Commentary did not
include the details on safe harbors, so MNEs have to wait until, hopefully,
later in 2022 for this issue to be resolved.
The U.S. Implementation of Pillar Two through the Build Back Better
(“BBB”) Act
The recently unveiled international tax provisions of the BBB Act182
represent the United States’ plan to implement Pillar Two. They also serve as
a significant move toward the United States’ implementation of the single tax
principle by introducing various mechanisms to ensure that cross-border
income is taxed once at a substantive tax rate. This Subpart discusses the
proposed changes in the BBB and how they fit in with the new international
tax regime, especially Pillar Two.
Global Intangible Low Tax Income (“GILTI”)
Probably the most important element in the BBB Act is the modification
of the GILTI rules. The BBB Act raises the GILTI tax rate from 10.5
percent183 to fifteen percent184 (15.8 percent with foreign tax credits), reduces
the exemption ratio of tangible assets (QBAI) from ten percent 185 to five
percent,186 and applies the GILTI rule on a country-by-country basis.187
report-international/companies-eager-to-see-details-on-minimum-tax-simplifications; Allison
Christians, Full Professor, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Tax Law, McGill University Faculty
of Law, Oral Presentation “Let the GILTI GloBE Games Begin” at the 4th Annual UCI Law–
A. Lavar Taylor Tax Symposium (Mar. 21, 2022); BEPS Monitoring Group Comments on the
Model Rules for a Global Anti-Base-Erosion Minimum Corporate Tax, supra note 28, at 1427.
180 Gottlieb, supra note 179.
181 Model Rules, supra note 172, at 47, art. 8.2. However, BEPS Monitoring Group
criticizes that such safe harbors protect the interest of MNEs and may harm the goal of Pillar
Two. BEPS Monitoring Group Comments on the Model Rules for a Global Anti-Base-Erosion
Minimum Corporate Tax, supra note 28, at 1427.
182 H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021) (Introduced in the House on Sept. 27, 2021, referred
to the House Budget Committee, Build Back Better Act Rules Committee Print, updated Nov.
3, 2021) [hereinafter Build Back Better (“BBB”) Act].
183 Daniel Bunn, Piling on the GILTI Verdicts, TAX FOUND. (July 15, 2021),
http://taxfoundation.org/biden-gilti-proposal/ (“Half of GILTI is taxed at the U.S. corporate rate
of 21 percent, which means the basic rate on GILTI is 10.5 percent.”).
184 BBB Act, H.R. 5347, § 138131(a)(3) (2021).
185 I.R.C. § 951A(b)(2)(A).
186 BBB Act, H.R. 5347, § 138126(d) (2021).
187 BBB Act, H.R. 5347, § 138124(a) (2021). GILTI is currently calculated using MNEs’
global average tax rates, but under BBB, GILTI would be calculated based on a MNEs
operations in each individual country. Daniel Bunn, GILTI by Country is not as Simple as it
Seems, TAX FOUND. (May 18, 2021), http://taxfoundation.org/gilti-by-country/. For game
theoretic model analysis comparing a global average regime and a country-by-country regime,
see Sanchirico, supra note 31(suggesting that a global average model is superior to a countryby-country regime).
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GILTI has been the most successful unilateral implementation of the
single tax principle by a residence country. But the proposed changes in the
BBB Act are intended to implement Pillar Two’s GloBE rules with other
participating countries. The new GILTI rate of fifteen percent is the same as
the global minimum tax rate of fifteen percent in Pillar Two. The reduction
of the QBAI limit to five percent is similar to the substance carve-out
permitted by the OECD. 188 Specifically, the OECD’s substance carve-out
under Pillar Two “will exclude an amount of income that is five percent of
the carrying value of tangible assets and payroll.” 189 Country-by-country
application of GILTI is required by Pillar Two.190
These changes in the U.S. law, if enacted, make it much more promising
that the other G20 countries will enact similar changes. If all the G20
members follow up on their commitments to the Statement, the world will be
much closer to achieving the single tax principle. Since ninety percent of large
MNEs are headquartered in the G20,191 this means that they will be subject
to the fifteen percent minimum tax in residence countries. That in turn should
enable source countries to apply the UTPR and the STTR without worrying
that an MNE can move its operations elsewhere to pay a lower rate. As the
single tax principle proposes, substantive taxation will exist in either
residence or source countries via corrective measures.
It is also important that the GILTI foreign tax credit limit is raised from
eighty percent to ninety-five percent, 192 because that means that source
country taxes that meet the global minimum tax rate will be almost fully
creditable against residence taxation. This change shows another important
element of the single tax principle, because if a source tax is substantial
enough to satisfy the global minimum tax rate, it counts as taxing “once” and
thus residence taxation yields to source to guarantee a “single” tax on such
income. Then why not allow 100 percent of foreign tax credit instead of
limiting it to ninety-five percent? The limitation presumably intends to
remind U.S. MNEs to consider U.S. tax implications instead of simply paying
foreign taxes without consideration at the expense of the U.S. tax revenue.
We would have preferred the global minimum tax rate in Pillar Two and
the GILTI rate proposed by the Biden administration to be higher than fifteen
percent—for example, twenty-one percent—because twenty-one percent is
the current corporate income tax rate of the United States193 and is closer to
the average corporate tax rate of the G20 (26.96 percent).194 Furthermore, we
would have preferred to eliminate the QBAI exemption for offshore tangible
assets because there is no reason to limit the corrective measures initiated by
the residence country, such as GILTI, to income from offshore intangible
assets. Nonetheless, the GILTI provisions in the BBB Act represent a
188 Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
189 Id.
190 Statement, supra note 1, at 5 (“It is agreed that Pillar Two will apply a minimum rate
on a jurisdictional basis. In that context, consideration will be given to the conditions under
which the US GILTI regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules, to ensure a level playing
field.”).
191 Saez & Zucman, supra note 67.
192 BBB Act, H.R. 5347, § 138127(a) (2021).
193 I.R.C. § 11.
194 Asen, supra note 28.
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reasonable compromise position to realize the single tax principle.
Some Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives, such as
Congressmen Tom O’Halleran, Henry Cuellar, and Lou Correa, expressed
concern that the changes to GILTI in the BBB Act could reduce the
competitiveness of U.S. MNEs.195 Their concern is primarily that the U.S.
government has moved too quickly by instituting these rules before the rest
of the world and creating what they argue are new rules, specifically, the
country-by-country regime.196 These Congressmen posit that the “new rules
in the [Ways and Means Committee’s] draft would allow other countries to
take advantage of our rules, and harm U.S. companies. If we wait, it will allow
Congress the opportunity to adjust the implementation of the policy based on
how G20 countries write their own GILTI regimes.”197
Foreign Tax Credit (“FTC”) Limitations
The BBB Act requires FTC determinations on a country-by-country
basis.198 This tightens up the availability of the FTC by adding another cap to
the creditable amount of foreign taxes per country. The new per-country
limitation on top of the existing basket limitations (per category of income)
in the FTC rules199 finally achieves the Reagan Administration’s proposal
from 1985, 200 which suggested both per category and per country limits
applicable to FTCs.
Since the TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate to twenty-one percent,
most U.S. MNEs paying taxes to foreign countries would be in an excess FTC
position, meaning that the MNEs’ foreign taxes exceed the credit limit
allowed by the U.S. tax law.201 Furthermore, the proposed global minimum
tax rate of fifteen percent is still lower than the U.S. corporate tax rate of
twenty-one percent, which may still offer room for moderate tax competition
among countries. Hence, allowing generous FTCs to U.S. MNEs would
reduce U.S. tax revenue, undermining its social safety net. In that regard, the
BBB Act’s tightened FTC rule is essential to prevent cross-crediting202 (as
195 Lawmakers Recommend Caution on GILTI Changes, TAX NOTES (Oct. 8, 2021),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/global-intangible-low-taxed-incomegilti/lawmakers-recommend-caution-giltichanges/2021/10/20/7bcn7?highlight=headquartered%20G20.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 BBB Act, H.R. 5347, § 138124(a) (2021).
199 Cf. Michael Smith, Complexity of Biden’s FTC Proposals Sparks Worry, TAX NOTES
(Nov. 15, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/corporate-taxation/complexitybidens-ftc-proposals-sparks-worry/2021/11/15/7cl9w?highlight=build%20back%20better
(commenting that the new rule will add complication and thus administrability concerns:
“While the rules may look like those historically used when analyzing FTCs, the differences
between the Biden proposal and the per-country system of 1932 and 1960 are massive”).
200 WHITE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (May 1985), 389–96.
201 Garrett Watson, Tax Reform’s Broader Corporate Tax Base Opens More to Biden’s
Proposed Rate Hike, TAX FOUND. (June 22, 2021), http://taxfoundation.org/us-corporate-taxbase/ (“The TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent beginning in
2018. . .”).
202 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45186, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION:
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allowed by the TCJA) and to curb an incentive to invest in lower tax foreign
jurisdictions. Furthermore, this change would also reduce the incentives of
source countries to engage in tax competition by granting a tax holiday,
because even if they offer a low tax rate to U.S. MNEs, that would only
decrease the MNEs’ overall FTC availability due to the BBB Act’s percountry limitation.203
Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (“FDII”)
The Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (“FDII”) rule provides that
owners of intellectual property held in the United States with sales to foreign
customers are subject to a lower tax rate than the regular corporate tax rate of
twenty-one percent.204 Currently the effective tax rate is 13.125 percent.205
FDII has given an important advantage to U.S. MNEs with valuable
intangible property and significant exports, such as Apple and Google.
The BBB Act only raises the FDII effective tax rate from 13.125 percent
to 15.8 percent. 206 The effective tax rate increases because the BBB Act
reduces the deduction under Section 250 of the Internal Revenue Code for
FDII to 21.875 percent.207 The proposed effective tax rate is still lower than
the regular corporate tax rate of twenty-one percent. However, recently there
has been some evidence that the FDII rule does induce intangible property
migration to the United States.208 So, on balance, the revised rule in the BBB
Act shows improvement.
Nonetheless, the fundamental problem with FDII, besides its complexity,
persists: Allowing a lower tax rate for U.S. MNEs with intangibles associated
THE 2017 REVISION (P.L. 115-97) 3 (2021), http://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45186.pdf (“Crosscrediting occurs when credits for taxes paid to one country that are in excess of the U.S. tax due
on income from that country can be used to offset U.S. tax due on income earned in a second
country that imposes little or no tax.”).
203 The foregone cross-crediting eliminated by the BBB Act might have a synergy with
the anti-deferral rules in the TCJA.
204 Daniel Bunn, Will FDII Stay or Will It Go?, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2021),
http://taxfoundation.org/will-fdii-stay-will-go/ (“Like a patent box, FDII was meant to
encourage companies to keep their intellectual property (IP) in the U.S. or bring it back to the
U.S. from offshore locations.”).
205 I.R.C. § 250(a). The Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (“FDII”) deduction reduces
the effective tax rate from twenty-one percent to 13.125%. Frank J. Vari, Foreign-derived
Intangible Income Deduction: Tax Reform’s Overlooked New Benefit for U.S. Corporate
Exporters,
TAX
ADVISER
(Aug.
2,
2018),
http://www.thetaxadviser.com/newsletters/2018/aug/foreign-derived-intangible-incomededuction.html.
206 Alex Durante, Cody Kallen, Huaqun Li, William McBride, Alex Muresianu, Erica
York & Garret Watson, Build Back Better Act: Details & Analysis of Tax Provisions in the
$1.75 Trillion Reconciliation Bill, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2021), http://taxfoundation.org/buildback-better-plan-reconciliation-bill-tax (“[BBB] reduce[s] the deduction for Foreign-Derived
Intangible Income (FDII) to 21.875 percent, resulting in a tax rate of 15.8 percent, effective for
tax years beginning after December 31, 2022.”).
207 Id.
208 Martin A. Sullivan, Big Tech Is Moving Profit to the United States, TAX NOTES (Aug.
23, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/corporate-taxation/big-tech-movingprofit-united-states/2021/08/23/776cs; Daniel Bunn, Intellectual Property Came Back to U.S.
After Tax Reform, But Proposals Could Change That, TAX FOUND. (July 21, 2021),
http://taxfoundation.org/intellectual-property-tax-proposals.
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with export is a blatant violation of the World Trade Organization subsidies
code.209 The fact that FDII may be working increases the incentive for foreign
trading partners to sue the United States in the World Trade Organization.
Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”)
The TCJA introduced the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”)
to prevent base erosion and profit shifting.210 It denies deductions for certain
otherwise deductible payments from a U.S. corporation to a related foreign
corporation and instead imposes a tax at ten percent (12.5 percent starting in
2026) payable to the United States. 211 This rule is intended to protect
sufficient taxation in source countries.
However, the BEAT has not been very successful so far in raising the
revenue that policymakers expected in 2017 when they introduced it.212 But
there is evidence that BEAT revenue may be increasing and that this is likely
to continue, as the BBB Act increases the BEAT rate applicable to the base
erosion payments from ten percent in 2022 (12.5 percent in 2023, fifteen
percent in 2024) to eighteen percent starting in 2025.213 The BBB Act also
fixes some important problems with the BEAT by applying the BEAT to, for
example, interest expenses capitalized into inventory.214 The most important
change is making the BEAT application by source countries conditional on
the tax rate of residence countries, which is consistent with the single tax
principle and the UTPR of Pillar Two.215
Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) for Corporations
A domestic tax provision in the BBB Act that is also relevant to the single
tax principle in the new international tax regime is the new book-based216
209 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement on
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14; see also INT’L
TRADE ADMIN., TRADE GUIDE: WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, http://www.trade.gov/tradeguide-wto-subsidies (last visited Mar. 2, 2022) (“A subsidy granted by a WTO member
government is prohibited by the Subsidies Agreement if it is contingent, in law or in fact, on
export performance, or on the use of domestic over imported goods. These prohibited subsidies
are commonly referred to as export subsidies and import substitution subsidies, respectively.
They are deemed to be specific and are viewed as particularly harmful under the Subsidies
Agreement and U.S. law.”).
210 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON BASE
EROSION AND ANTI-ABUSE TAX, (2020), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-providesadditional-guidance-on-base-erosion-and-anti-abuse-tax.
211 I.R.C. §§ 59A(b)(1)(A), 59A(b)(2)(A).
212 Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The BEAT Is Down but Not out, TAX NOTES
(Aug. 9, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/base-erosion-andantiabuse-tax-beat/economic-analysis-beat-down-not-out/2021/08/09/76zw8; see also U.S.
DEP’T
TREASURY, THE
MADE IN
AMERICA
TAX PLAN
12
(2021),
http://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf.
213 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138131(a)(3) (2021) (indicating that the BEAT rate will be
ten percent in 2022, 12.5 percent in 2023, fifteen percent in 2024, and eighteen percent in 2025
and thereafter); see also Sullivan, supra note 212.
214 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138131(b)(2).
215 See infra Part III.A.1.
216 Referring to the amount of income corporations publicly report to shareholders in
financial statements. Durante, et al., supra note 206.
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alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) for corporations, set at fifteen percent.217
The AMT was designed to reduce a taxpayer's ability to avoid taxes by using
certain deductions and other tax benefit items. 218 The TCJA repealed the
AMT for corporations, but the BBB Act reintroduces it. 219 The new rule
applies to MNEs with an average revenue of over $1 billion USD.220 The
modified corporate AMT rule applies to both U.S. MNEs and foreign MNEs
whose U.S. revenue exceeds $100 million USD over three years.221 Thus, it
is an important backstop to the BEAT as well as GILTI by offering another
minimum tax rate. It is also consistent with both the IIR for residence country
and the UTPR for source country.222
A New Cap on Interest Expense Deduction
For domestic subsidiaries of foreign MNEs, the BBB Act contains a new
cap on net interest expense deduction. The provision limits deductions of net
interest expenses to 110 percent of the ratio of the domestic subsidiary’s
Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (“EBITDA”)
to the MNE’s EBITDA.223 This is another protection in addition to the BEAT
to prevent the base-erosion payments by MNEs.
Room for Improvement
Overall, the international tax provisions in the BBB Act show
commitment by the United States to the implementation of Pillar Two and a
global minimum tax. They also mark a substantial improvement over the
TCJA’s international tax provisions, as shown in the increased GILTI and
BEAT rates and the tightened FTC rules. They are likely to produce
significant revenue and therefore help strengthen the U.S. social safety net.
However, like any legislation that needs to receive a majority vote in
Congress, the provisions of the BBB Act represent a compromise. To better
realize the single tax principle and combat tax competition, the BBB Act
could have proposed a higher GILTI rate with more rigorous anti-base erosion
rules.
Furthermore, the BBB Act still lacks an anti-inversion rule. Corporate
inversion, also known as tax inversion, occurs when a domestic company
moves its headquarters or base of operations overseas to reduce its tax
burdens.224 Inversion occurs when MNEs shop around countries looking for
low(er) tax rates, resulting in tax competition among countries hoping to host
migrating MNEs. Before the TCJA, when the maximum corporate tax rate
217 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138101(a).
218 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TOPIC NO. 556 ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (last
updated Jan. 21, 2022), http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc556.
219 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138101.
220 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138101(a)(2), at 1733.
221 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138101(a)(2), at 1733.
222 See infra Part III.A.1.
223 BBB Act, H.R. 5376, § 138111(a).
224 See Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1 (2015); Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 807 (2015).
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was thirty-five percent, a lot of U.S. pharmaceutical companies with valuable
intangible assets inverted, and low-tax Ireland was a popular new corporate
home. 225 In 2004, Congress added Section 7874 to the Internal Revenue
Code, which significantly limits the tax benefits associated with corporate
inversions.226 However, more than twenty high-profile inversions were still
reported in the early 2010s.227 The number has reduced significantly since the
TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate to twenty-one percent, and the BBB Act
maintains the corporate tax rate as twenty-one percent. 228 But twenty-one
percent is still higher than the global minimum tax rate of fifteen percent, and
U.S. MNEs may still want to relocate to other countries with the minimum
tax rate of fifteen percent. A corporate inversion that manages to avoid
Section 7874 will not be subject to GILTI or the anti-inversion provisions of
the BEAT, because that corporation will no longer be a U.S. taxpayer. Such
an inversion may keep tax competition going among countries until the global
effective tax rate hits fifteen percent. Given that Pillar Two does not guarantee
the full harmony of global corporate tax rates, the BBB Act should have
included a more robust anti-inversion rule.229
Compatibility with Pillar Two Model Rules
The proposed BBB Act was passed by the House of Representatives in
November 2021, but not by the Senate.230 If the BBB Act is enacted in the
version that passed the House, the United States will be fully compliant with
Pillar Two Model Rules, because both the GILTI rate and the BEAT rate
would be raised to fifteen percent, and the BEAT rate would be made
contingent upon low taxation at residence, so that the BEAT operates as a
UTPR.
First, raising the GILTI rate to fifteen percent is consistent with the IIR,
for which the Pillar Two Model Rules require a top-up tax to fifteen percent
imposed at the parent level of a multinational. The QBAI exception to GILTI
is consistent with Pillar Two’s substance carve-out from IIR. 231 In this
context, the OECD stated in a recent document that—
225 Zachary Midler, Quick Take: Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017, 4:35 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion.
226 See I.R.C. § 7874(a)(1).
227 Midler, supra note 225.
228 Garrett Watson, Tax Base Opens More to Biden’s Proposed Rate Hike, TAX FOUND.
(June 22, 2021) http://taxfoundation.org/us-corporate-tax-base (indicating the TCJA reduced
the corporate income tax rate from thirty-five to twenty-one percent).
229 For example, policymakers may consider reducing the threshold in Section 7874 to,
for example, fifty percent and including a managed and controlled alternative definition of
corporate residency.
230 Christina Wilkie, House Passes $1.75 Trillion Biden Plan That Funds Universal PreK, Medicare Expansion and Renewable Energy Credits, CNBC (Nov. 19, 2021),
http://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/19/biden-build-back-better-bill-house-passes-social-safety-netand-climate-plan.html; Yacob Reyes, Tim Kaine: Build Back Better Is 'Dead' But Core
Provisions Will Pass, AXIOS (Jan. 16, 2022), http://www.axios.com/tim-kaine-spendingpackage-6560dd77-b5bc-4d86-893e-dabfebc7e57a.html.
231 I.R.C. § 951A(b)(2)(A). Even though the BBB Act calculates the QBAI exception a
bit differently (based on assets rather than assets and payroll), it would be considered a minor
variation.
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As noted in the Preamble to the Pillar Two Model Rules, consideration
will be given to the conditions under which the US Global Intangible
Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules,
to ensure a level playing field.232
This assurance suggests that the Biden Administration has obtained a
concession that the GILTI will be considered as satisfying the IIR as long as
the rate is raised to at least fifteen percent.
Second, making BEAT contingent on the level of taxation in the
residence country will ensure that BEAT operates in practice in a way that is
compatible with the UTPR.233 In addition, the fact that UTPR comes after IIR
makes it less crucial whether the U.S. BEAT rule will firmly comply with
Pillar Two, because most foreign MNEs that are potentially subject to the
BEAT rule in the United States will be subject to IIR in their residence
countries first.234
If the BBB Act is not enacted, however, then it is less likely that GILTI
and BEAT as enacted by the TCJA will be considered compatible with Pillar
Two. First, the current GILTI rate of 10.5 percent is well below the IIR
minimum tax rate of fifteen percent in the residence country. As a result, U.S.
MNEs will in many cases be subject to UTPR in the source country.
Unfortunately, it is not certain whether those corrective taxes imposed by the
source country under UTPR would be creditable against the U.S. MNEs’ U.S.
tax liabilities. Some commentators seem to believe that the source taxation
under UTPR is creditable, resulting in significant shifting of tax revenue from
the United States to foreign jurisdictions.235 However, it is also possible that
the source taxation under UTPR is not creditable. The United States has
recently amended its foreign tax credit rules to make it more difficult to get a
credit for foreign taxes in the absence of what the United States considers
adequate nexus to a foreign country.236 This change was designed to clarify
that DSTs are not creditable.237 But the scope of the new foreign tax credit
rule is broad and may apply to the source taxation under UTPR to deny
foreign tax credits, causing double taxation in the residence (U.S.) and source
countries.
Second, the current BEAT rate of ten percent is likewise too low for
UTPR purposes in the source country. In addition, the current BEAT is not
contingent on the level of the residence country taxation. As a result, it is
likely that BEAT will not be compliant with Pillar Two, and thus, foreign
232 OECD, THE PILLAR TWO RULES IN A NUTSHELL 2 (Dec. 2021),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/pillar-two-model-rules-in-a-nutshell.pdf.
233 BEAT was introduced as an alternative minimum tax in the TCJA and not a top-up
tax mechanism as envisioned by Pillar Two. However, the BBB Act’s revision of BEAT rule
may make it compliant to UTPR.
234 The BEAT has a $500 million USD revenue threshold. I.R.C. § 59A(e)(1)(B).
235 Dylan Moroses, US Could Lose Tax Revenue If It Neglects OECD's Pillar 2, LAW360
TAX AUTHORITY (Mar. 18, 2022), http://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1475431/uscould-lose-tax-revenue-if-it-neglects-oecd-s-pillar-2.
236 87 Fed. Reg. 276 (Jan. 4, 2022) (Guidance Related to the Foreign Tax Credit;
Clarification of Foreign-Derived Intangible Income).
237 Id. at 289–90.
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residence countries will not respect the U.S. tax paid under BEAT rules when
they apply IIR, causing double taxation in the residence and source
countries.238
Therefore, the tax consequences of not complying with Pillar Two when
the rest of the world does comply are likely to be tax revenue loss in the
United States and the increased risk of double taxation by taxpayers. The
results harm the single tax principle that the global deal aims to accomplish.
Hence, the authors of this article hope that Congress will pass the provisions
relating to Pillar Two in 2022 as is proposed in the BBB Act, regardless of
how they are rebranded and repromoted.
In March 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
Greenbook for fiscal year 2023.239 This publication outlines and explains the
Biden Administration’s tax proposals. The budget released by Treasury
assumes that the BBB Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on
November 19, 2021, will be enacted.240 However, if the corporate tax rate
would increase to twenty-eight percent, the GILTI rate would automatically
increase to twenty-one percent.
IV. PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF THE GLOBAL MINIMUM TAX
Pillar Two would significantly reduce MNEs’ incentives to change their
place of residence or the location of their headquarters to exploit tax
competition by source countries. However, it is important to note that Pillar
Two also offers measures for effective residence-based taxation. This Part
discusses the promises and pitfalls of Pillar Two. First, we discuss the
promise of global tax reform, specifically, raising additional revenue and
reducing profit shifting. Second, we explore the various challenges facing
Pillar Two, notably, concerns of developing countries, various carve-outs,
and the logistical puzzle of implementation.
Promise of the New International Tax Regime
Many policymakers who participated in the global tax deal hail the
Statement as a long-waited international tax reform and an important step in
combatting tax competition, tax base erosion, and profit shifting. Mathias
Cormann, OECD Secretary-General said that “the deal would make the

238 Current BEAT may not only be incompatible with Pillar Two, but also has another
problem. Some commentators argue that BEAT is discriminatory because it applies only to
payments to related foreign parties by partially denying deductions, and thus may violate Art.
24 (nondiscrimination) of most tax treaties. See H. David Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen, The
BEAT and the Treaties, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 53 (2018); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Brett Wells,
The Beat and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, 6 (UNIV. MICH.
LAW & ECON. Working Papers, 2018).
239 U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2023 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2022).
240 Id. at iii (stating that the revenue proposals based on provisions of Title XIII of H.R.
5376 as passed by the House of Representatives on November 19, 2021, except for Sec.
137601).
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international corporate tax system ‘fairer and work better.’”241 We believe
that Pillar Two, in particular, would generate substantial revenue and lead to
behavioral changes in both countries and taxpayers to engage in less tax
competition. In short, Pillar Two is the modern embodiment of the single tax
principle.
Additional Revenue
Pillar Two, with its global minimum corporate income tax of fifteen
percent, is expected to generate approximately $150 billion USD in additional
global tax revenues each year.242 While the primary revenue effects of Pillar
One will be the reallocation of profits (about $100 billion USD) to source
countries annually,243 Pillar Two is a true revenue generator. Hence, from a
global perspective, the global tax reform will benefit the world via revenue
generation. 244 The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), representing an
additional fifty-one countries, also backs the plan, indicating broader global
support outside the Inclusive Framework. 245 The additional revenue
generated by Pillar Two may be used to recover national economies from the
pandemic or to support sustainable tax policies relating to Environmental,
Social, and Corporate Governance (“ESG”).246
Reducing Profit Shifting and Tax Competition: A Realization of the
Single Tax Principle
Pillar Two mandates a fifteen percent global minimum tax, compelling
the global community to stop tax competition and the race to the bottom. As
a result, Pillar Two is expected to reduce profit shifting by MNEs. If enough
large economies agree to implement Pillar Two, there will be no incentive for
companies to move their businesses to low-tax jurisdictions. U.S. Treasury
Secretary Janet L. Yellen, who negotiated the deal, praised Pillar Two as

241 Chris Giles, Emma Agyemang & Aime Williams, 136 Nations Agree to Biggest
Corporate
Tax
Deal
in
a
Century,
FIN.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2021),
http://www.ft.com/content/5dc4e2d5-d7bd-4000-bf94-088f17e21936.
242 OECD, TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM
THE DIGITILISATION OF THE ECONOMY 5 (Oct. 2021), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochuretwo-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-theeconomy-october-2021.pdf.
243 130 Countries and Jurisdictions Join Bold New Framework for International Tax
Reform, OECD (July 1, 2021), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/130-countries-andjurisdictions-join-bold-new-framework-for-international-tax-reform.htm.
244 William Horobin, Global Tax Overhaul Endorsed by 130 Nations as Deal Gets
Closer, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2021, 9:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202107-01/global-tax-overhaul-endorsed-by-130-nations-as-deal-gets-closer.
245 Eric Martin, IMF Sees Room to Simplify Global Tax Deal to Boost Participation,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2021), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-10/imf-seesroom-to-simplify-global-tax-deal-to-boost-participation.
246 Stephen Cooper, House Sends Biden’s $1.75T Budget Plan to Senate, LAW360 (Nov.
19, 2021), http://www.law360.com/tax-authority/federal/articles/1442179 (explaining how the
BBB Act plans to use revenue to pay for new or expanded tax incentives for child care,
renewable energy, and health care).

38

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/223
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4102332

38

Avi-Yonah and Kim:

ending the race to the bottom on corporate taxation rates.247
Therefore, Pillar Two resolves the traditional economics debate between
advocates of capital export neutrality (“CEN”) and supporters of capital
import/ownership neutrality (“CIN”/ “CON”),248 because this debate rests on
the assumption that corporate tax rates cannot be harmonized and thus
companies have different incentives for choice of location under each
theory. 249 However, if corporate tax rates are harmonized, as expected in
Pillar Two, then CEN, CIN, and CON can be achieved simultaneously.250
Importantly, Pillar Two eliminates the main critique that has bedeviled
the United States’ attempts to raise taxes on its MNEs since the 1960s. The
argument that the unilateral adoption of higher rates of corporate tax on
MNEs’ foreign source income puts U.S. MNEs at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis MNEs from other countries is often used. 251 This argument has
never been persuasive because, both in the 1960s and today, U.S. MNEs
dominate their competition.252 But it had political appeal, leading to the TCJA
reducing the corporate tax rate to twenty-one percent. 253 However, such
competitive rhetoric would disappear as a concern if all the G20 MNEs,
which comprise over ninety percent of all MNEs, were subject to the same
minimum tax rate.
An important aspect of Pillar Two that is not addressed in the Statement
but is essential for successful implementation is the prevention of MNEs from
leaving the G20 and thereby escaping the IIR of residence country (although
perhaps not the UTPR/STTR). In most EU countries this is unlikely because
of their corporate exit taxes.254 But the United States and the United Kingdom
247 David J. Lynch, Global Minimum Tax Effort Moves Forward as Ireland and Hungary
Join Pact, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2021), http://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2021/10/08/minimum-corporate-tax-oecd-biden.
248 Capital export neutrality (“CEN”) refers to an investor's choice between investing her
savings in her country of residence or in a foreign source country. CEN exists when residence
and source country investments that earn the same pretax return also yield the same after-tax
return. On the other hand, capital import neutrality (“CIN”) requires that the earnings from
capital in a source country be taxed at the same rate for both domestic and foreign investors.
Capital ownership neutrality (“CON”) is an alternative neutrality, demanding that taxation not
influence who owns assets. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International
Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, David R. Tillinghast Lecture
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 270–77 (2001); Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture
- The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2010).
249 Desai & Hines, supra note 248; Graetz, supra note 248; Shaviro supra note 248.
250 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Is It Time to Coordinate Corporate Tax Rates? A Note on
Horst (U. of Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Series, Paper No. 382, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389959.
251 Daniel Bunn, U.S. Cross-Border Tax Reform and the Cautionary Tale of GILTI, TAX
FOUND. (Feb. 17, 2021), http://taxfoundation.org/gilti-us-cross-border-tax-reform/#Key.
252 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Nicola Sartori, Symposium on International Taxation and
Competitiveness: Introduction and Overview, 65 TAX L. REV 313, 319 (2012); see also Biggest
Companies
in
the
World
2022,
FINANCECHARTS,
http://www.financecharts.com/screener/biggest (last visited Mar. 29, 2022) (indicating the top
10 companies are from the United States).
253 I.R.C. § 11.
254 Sebastian Dueñas & Daniel Bunn, Tax Avoidance Rules Increase the Compliance
Burden in EU Member Countries, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 28, 2019), http://taxfoundation.org/eutax-avoidance-rules-increase-tax-compliance-burden (indicating that seventeen of twenty-eight
EU countries have exit taxes).
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do not have such taxes, making corporate exodus a viable concern. 255
Furthermore, the United States has a different definition of corporate
residency from the rest of the world: A business incorporated in the United
States is a U.S. tax resident regardless of its domiciliary or place of
management,256 whereas other countries, to a broad extent, use both the place
of incorporation and place of management tests. 257 Such mismatches of
corporate residence rules may aggravate the concern that, even if Pillar Two
firmly established the single tax principle in the G20, another form of tax
competition among non-G20 countries may emerge for hosting migrating
companies.
Potential Challenges
So far, Pillar Two has received overall positive responses from the media
and commentators. However, there have also been criticisms about the
specifics of the agreement. Common criticisms are that Pillar Two does not
go far enough to ensure MNEs are taxed fairly, that various carve-outs and
exceptions make the agreement unbalanced, and that it is unclear what would
happen to Pillar Two in the implementation stage. This Subpart discusses
these challenges and offers possible responses.
Priority to Residence-Based Taxation and Developing Countries’
Concerns
It is true that Pillar Two is quite complex and possibly flawed since it
accords primacy to the country of residence by giving priority to IIR for
residence taxation over UTPR and STTR for source taxation. Thus, the source
country’s tax will only be applicable if the residence country chooses not to
tax.
The precedence of the IIR over the UTPR/STTR in Pillar Two has also
led to critiques of Pillar Two—namely that it is not reflective of the concerns
of developing countries that largely consist of source countries. For example,
the Tax Justice Network and Oxfam criticized the global minimum tax for
unfairly providing advantages to the world’s wealthier countries. 258
Specifically, they argue that the imposition of residence-based tax on MNEs
under the IIR will make it impossible for developing countries to attract FDI
by granting tax concessions, and that the UTPR and STTR are meaningless if
all the income of MNEs is already subject to the minimum tax rate of fifteen

255 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95
TAX NOTES 1793 (June 17, 2002).
256 See David R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition: Foreign and Domestic Taxpayers, 2
INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 239, 252–53 (1984).
257 Christos Theophilou, Insight: Corporate Residence Post-BEPS and Global Mobility,
BLOOMBERG TAX (June 10, 2020, 3:00 AM), http://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-reportinternational/insight-corporate-residence-post-beps-and-global-mobility.
258 Hamish Boland-Rudder & Spencer Woodman, 136 Countries Agree to Global
Minimum Tax for Corporations in ‘Historic’ OECD Deal, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM (Oct. 8, 2021), http://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/136-countriesagree-to-global-minimum-tax-for-corporations-in-historic-oecd-deal.
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percent under the IIR.259 Despite lofty goals of ending tax havens and tax
competition, the critiques highlight sizeable incentives for profit shifting that
still remain due to exemptions and loopholes that the global tax deal was
supposed to curtail.260
This critique is only partially valid, however. The first criticism about
the ability to attract FDI assumes that developing countries actually wish to
grant tax concessions to MNEs based on a cost/benefit analysis. This is not
true. Most empirical studies suggest that the main reason to allow tax
concessions, tax holidays, and tax competition is the threat of the MNEs
going elsewhere.261 If that is the case, developing countries would benefit
from the IIR because it neutralizes the MNE’s ability to conduct such an
auction by subjecting it to the minimum tax wherever it goes.
It is true that if the UTPR/STTR for source taxation were given primacy
over the IIR for residence taxation then developing countries might gain more
revenue. However, it is not clear that in the absence of the IIR, developing
countries would be able to impose taxes under the UTPR/STTR because,
without the IIR for residence taxation, the MNE could threaten to go
elsewhere. In other words, the IIR neutralizes the behavioral incentives of
multinational taxpayers to engage in location shopping and the UTTR/STTR
neutralizes the incentive of source countries to engage in tax competition.
In addition, foreign tax credits will be available under the IIR just like
they are (with limitations) under GILTI. This means that, in practice,
developing countries can impose source taxation on MNEs’ FDI, and those
MNEs will not suffer because these taxes will be credited against the
residence taxation imposed by the IIR.
Finally, the substance carve-outs will enable developing countries to
engage in some level of tax competition for real investment. Large developing
countries are also expected to gain significant additional revenue from Pillar
One. For all these reasons, we believe that the critique that Pillar Two
disadvantages developing countries is exaggerated.262
Nonetheless, there might be an alternative to Pillar Two that implements
the single tax principle more effectively with fewer concerns to developing
countries. That is, Pillar Two may be tweaked in order to ensure that countries
can tax MNEs on both inbound and outbound investments. This could be done
by applying a substance-based test using a fractional apportionment method
in transfer pricing. This method would allocate MNEs’ profits that have not
been effectively taxed amongst all countries in which a MNE has a taxable
presence. Once profits of MNEs are allocated among relevant countries based
on the substance-based test, each country would impose taxes on such profits
according to their own respective tax rates. This alternative would not require
the application of the complex IIR and UTPR, and instead rely on fractional
apportionment based on assets, personnel, and sales revenue (by locations of
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North-South Divide: International Redistribution
and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371 (2004).
262 For similar reasons, we respectfully oppose the argument that tax harmony and
cooperation envisioned in Pillar Two does not help developing countries. See Cui, supra note
31.
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customers or users). While the GloBE rules impose a top-up tax only in the
country of residence,263 this alternative would allow all affected countries,
either as residence or source, to impose tax based on their respective shares
of the undertaxed profits.
Various Carve-Outs
During the negotiation of Pillar Two in mid-2021, there were nine
countries that opposed it. 264 These countries included several in Europe,
namely Hungary, Ireland, and Estonia. Although they account for just four
percent of the EU’s economic output, they were in a position to deal a
significant blow to the prospects of the OECD’s tax plan.265 Tax directives in
the EU require the unanimous consent of all twenty-seven member states,
effectively giving a single EU member veto power over the agreement.266
Statements made by officials in each country emphasized that Ireland,
Hungary, and Estonia did not present a united front or adhere to a common
core principle.267 Ireland supported Pillar One but demanded that the fifteen
percent global minimum tax rate be lower because its corporate tax rate is
12.5 percent.268 Hungary had issues with the plan’s industry carve-outs.269
Finally, Estonia simply wanted to preserve its unique tax system.270
263 Statement, supra note 1, at 3–4.
264 Cliff Taylor & Ellen O’Riordan, Ireland One of 9 Countries to Hold Out on Signing
OECD
Global
Tax
Deal,
IRISH TIMES
(July 1,
2021,
5:08
PM),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-one-of-9-countries-to-hold-out-onsigning-oecd-global-tax-deal-1.4609129; see also Jorge Liboreiro, Ireland, Hungary and
Estonia Opt out of OECD Tax Deal and Cast Shadow over EU’s Unified Position, EURONEWS
(Aug. 26, 2021), http://www.euronews.com/2021/07/02/ireland-hungary-and-estonia-opt-outof-oecd-tax-deal-and-cast-shadow-over-eu-s-unified-pos (indicating the nine countries that did
not sign on to the OECD global deal are Ireland, Hungary, Estonia, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, Sri
Lanka, Barbados, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).
265 Zoltan Simon & Peter Flanagan, European Trio Cast Dissatisfied Shadow over Global
Tax Accord, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2021), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0702/europe-s-new-awkward-squad-casts-shadow-over-global-tax-deal.
266 Christopher Condon, G-20 Finance Chiefs Back Tax Deal and Vow to Clear Hurdles,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2021), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-10/yellenoptimistic-congress-will-back-part-of-global-tax-deal. Cf. Faulhaber, supra note 23 (suggesting
that even if one of the member states remains a hold-out, the EU can possibly still implement
the global minimum tax portion of the OECD plan through the issuance of a directive. Whether
the directive would survive a legal challenge is uncertain, but the fact that the tax is a minimum
tax makes winning the challenge more likely).
267 Stephanie Soong Johnston & Sarah Paez, Ireland, Estonia to Join OECD Global Tax
Reform Deal, TAX NOTES (Oct. 11, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notesinternational/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/ireland-estonia-join-oecd-global-taxreform-deal/2021/10/11/7bbn3?highlight=opposition%20to%20OECD%20g.
268 Liz Alderman, Ireland’s Days as a Tax Haven May Be Ending, but Not Without a
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2021), http://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/business/irelandminimum-corporate-tax.html.
269 Elodie Lamer, Growing Unease in EU Over Global Tax Deal’s Next Steps, TAX
NOTES (July 12, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/corporatetaxation/growing-unease-eu-over-global-tax-deals-nextsteps/2021/07/12/76rz4?highlight=OECD.
270 Todd Buell, Estonian Official Airs Country’s Objections to Global Minimum Tax,
LAW
360
(July
16,
2021),
http://www.law360.com/tax-
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Eventually, the EU hold-out did not occur. One hundred and thirty-seven
countries, including Ireland, Hungary, and Estonia, agreed to the global tax
deal, including Pillar Two. However, the global tax deal now includes various
carve-outs and reservations. For example, Ireland agreed to end its 12.5
percent corporate tax rate and join the deal at the last minute, “with assurances
sought and received from the EU that it would not seek to increase the tax
rate further down the line.” 271 Hungary obtained the ten-year transition
period, during which it may “offer a lower rate of tax for tangible investments
in its jurisdiction—such as automotive plants.”272 China also succeeded in
having a clause inserted that would limit the effect of the global minimum tax
on companies who are starting to expand internationally—because of
concerns that its growing domestic companies would be clipped by the
measures.273
Commentators argue that these carve-outs and exemptions failed the
original ambition of the global tax deal. Instead of leveling the playing field,
the watered-down measures mean that only a “sliver of the profits” of MNEs
will become taxable, while incentives to shift profits remain sizable.274 Alex
Coham, CEO of the Tax Justice Network, commented in a statement that,
“[i]t’s no wonder that Ireland and other havens have embraced the deal,
especially after obtaining various concessions.”275 Civil society organization,
Oxfam, also criticized that the global deal panders to tax havens and
multinational corporations with exemptions and loopholes that meant the new
measures have “practically no teeth” and will offer no revenue help to the
world’s poorest countries.276
We also disfavor these carve-outs. Some level of compromise is
inevitable to achieve a global tax deal and bring almost 140 member states to
the negotiation table. However, the purpose of seeking a global deal for Pillar
Two is to accomplish tax harmony to end tax competition. These carve-outs
clearly violate the single tax principle by offering various methods for certain
countries to continue tax competition, especially among source countries.
What is worse, the carve-outs disturb tax harmony, weakening the
effectiveness of Pillar Two measures among countries who are fully
committed to the single tax principle.

authority/international/articles/1403781/estonian-official-airs-country-s-objections-to-globalminimum-tax. See also Kyle Pomerleau, The Key Component of the Estonia’s Competitive Tax
System, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/key-component-estonia-scompetitive-tax-system (explaining that the unique feature of Estonia’s corporate income tax
system is a cash-flow tax, meaning corporate income tax is only levied when business pay out
to shareholders).
271 Lisa O’Carroll, Ireland Ends 12.5% Tax Rate in OECD Global Pact, THE GUARDIAN,
(Oct. 7, 2021), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/07/ireland-poised-to-drop-125tax-rate-in-oecd-global-pact.
272 Giles, et al., supra note 241.
273 Id.
274 Boland-Rudder & Woodman, supra note 258.
275 Alex Cobham, OECD Tax Deal Fails to Deliver, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Oct. 8, 2021),
http://taxjustice.net/press/oecd-tax-deal-fails-to-deliver.
276 Press Release, OXFAM Int’l, OECD Tax Deal is a Mockery of Fairness: Oxfam (Oct.
8, 2021), http://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/oecd-tax-deal-mockery-fairness-oxfam.
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Logistical Puzzle
There is an additional concern about whether the global tax deal
consisting of Pillars One and Two could actually be implemented, especially
in the United States. 277 The goal is for countries to sign a multilateral
convention during 2022 with an effective date of 2023, although most
practitioners view this timeline as highly unlikely. Political realities in the
United States illustrate the complexities of implementing the global tax
agreement. 278 The Biden Administration has a pretty thin majority in the
Senate and in the House of Representatives, so it is very doubtful that the
G20/OECD international tax plan will be passed by the U.S. Congress in a
single bill, increasing the difficulty of ratification in the U.S. Senate. 279
Considering that the United States is important to have on board to ensure the
effective implementation of both Pillars, the successful implementation of the
global tax deal is an open question.
Pillar One will alter U.S. treaties with other countries, and therefore will
need to be implemented through a multilateral treaty approved by two-thirds
of the U.S. Senate. 280 However, getting seventeen Republican senators to
support a treaty measure that many view as penalizing U.S. companies may
be a non-starter in the current economic and political climate.281 The senior
Republicans on the tax-writing Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
committees already expressed opposition to Pillar One.282 Furthermore, in a
joint statement, Senator Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) and Congressman Kevin
Brady (R-Texas) criticized the Biden Administration for pursuing the global
tax deal agreement before Congress has acted on the administration’s
proposed changes to U.S. tax law, such as GILTI, calling into question how
quickly lawmakers may act on needed change.283 They also mentioned in a
joint statement that “as other countries delay implementation and secure side
agreements and carve-outs to protect their own companies, U.S. businesses
will be hit by tax increases ultimately borne by American workers, savers and
consumers.”284 Hence, Senate approval of Pillar One in any form will almost
277 Aime Williams, G7 Tax Deal Faces Opposition in US Congress, FIN. TIMES (June 9,
2021), http://www.ft.com/content/6c98b271-bd13-4517-81bb-6ef7f1798085.
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Plan, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2021), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2021/10/19/the-end-isnigh-an-update-on-the-oecd-tax-reform-plan/?sh=353cdb891634.
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282 Lynch, supra note 247.
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Chairman, Comm. on Fin. and Congressman Richard Neal, Chairman, Comm. on Ways and
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certainly require the inclusion of a ban on all current and future DSTs,
including the proposed EU digital levy.285
Pillar Two, on the other hand, is generally compatible with existing tax
treaties and can likely be implemented with changes to domestic tax
legislation.286 Unlike Pillar One, Pillar Two can be implemented without any
changes in existing tax treaties as far as the IIR is concerned, as evidenced by
the United States unilaterally adopting GILTI. 287 UTPR and STTR may
require changes in tax treaties, but they are of secondary importance because
they work conditionally. Since treaties are hard to change in the United States
because of Senate ratification, this is an important advantage of Pillar Two
over Pillar One. We also anticipate that a lot of countries will be
implementing Pillar Two by domestic legislation, given the strong interest in
its development and the fact that it helps countries protect their tax base by
embodying a modern single tax principle.
Therefore, the Biden Administration may attempt to use the
reconciliation process, only requiring a majority vote in the U.S. Senate, to
push through changes related to Pillar Two’s tax reform plan in the BBB Act
and negotiate with the Senate on Pillar One at a later time.288
However, the $3.5 trillion USD BBB Act still faces obstacles in the
closely divided House and Senate. Some House Democrats have pushed back
against any increases to the GILTI tax. 289 Furthermore, the piecemeal
implementation of the global tax reform plan that will likely happen in the
United States will unfortunately create tension between the United States and
the EU when good faith and trust are required in order for the plan to be fully
implemented. Nonetheless, the logistical puzzle for implementing Pillar Two
in the United States is less significant compared to that for Pillar One, which
should go through treaty ratification process in the Senate.
Hence, the United States’ enacting domestic legislation to implement
Pillar Two is the key to solving the logistical puzzle for the overall success of
the global tax reform plan as well as the modern single tax principle. To make
it possible, the two Pillars could be severed. The objective of both the OECD
and the United States seems to be to adopt both Pillars One and Two as a
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286 Faulhaber, supra note 23.
287 I.R.C. § 951A; see also Daniel Bunn, U.S. Cross-border Tax Reform and the
Cautionary Tale of GILTI, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 17, 2021), http://taxfoundation.org/gilti-us-crossborder-tax-reform (indicating that the U.S. adopted GILTI as an anti-base erosion rule).
288 Stephanie Soong Johnston, Reconciliation Bill May Have Global Minimum Tax
Provisions, TAX NOTES (July 12, 2021), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/politicstaxation/reconciliation-bill-may-have-global-minimum-taxprovisions/2021/07/12/76rl1?highlight=Pillar%201.
289 Alex Parker, How the Global Tax Agreement Could Backfire for Biden, LAW360,
(Oct. 18, 2021), http://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1431269/how-the-global-taxagreement-could-backfire-for-biden.
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package deal.290 Both address the tax challenges in the digitalized economy
and combat the base erosion and profit shifting by MNEs. However, Pillars
One and Two are conceptually separate from each other—Pillar One
modernizes source-based taxation, whereas Pillar Two embodies the single
tax principle by reinforcing residence-based taxation. There is no logical
reason to treat the two Pillars as “linked by more than just politics,” as the
United States argues.291
Furthermore, Pillar Two can be implemented by the G20 even if Pillar
One collapses because some countries refuse to abolish DSTs. In other words,
Pillar Two does not need universal implementation by all IF member states
because it is a measure that a country can implement to protect its own tax
base, irrespective of what other countries do. Hence, it is less critical,
although not desirable, if a low-tax jurisdiction does not implement Pillar
Two, because the domestic legislation resulting from Pillar Two will allow
the residence country to essentially tax back the income that has not been
taxed in the low-tax jurisdiction. Moreover, over ninety percent of large
MNEs are headquartered in the G20,292 so only a relatively small number of
countries need to agree to implement an effective global minimum tax.
However, Pillar Two still requires international cooperation among the G20
countries to adopt the harmonized domestic legislation that is essential to
stopping tax competition, base erosion, and profit shifting. Thus, the United
States should cooperate with the G20 countries to enact Pillar Two even if
Pillar One fails. Risking Pillar Two to salvage Pillar One is unwise and
regrettable because Pillar Two would be the first global tax harmony in
substantive tax law guided by the single tax principle.
CONCLUSION
In L’ancien Regime et la Revolution (1856), Alexis de Tocqueville
argued that the roots of the radical changes imposed by the French Revolution
could be found in the Old Regime it sought to replace.293 Similarly, the roots
of the new international tax regime as embodied in the Statement can be
traced to the benefits principle and the single tax principle, both of which
stem from the origins of the international tax regime a century ago. The
benefits principle was the compromise between the claims of residence and
source jurisdictions reached by the four economists in 1923, 294 while the
single tax principle can be traced to Thomas Adams in 1918 and the League
of Nations experts in 1927.295 However, unlike what happened in the French
Revolution, the Statement does not entirely replace the old international tax
regime. Instead, the Statement is an evolution from, or improvement of, the
benefits principle and the single tax principle.
290 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Presentation by the United States to the Steering Group
of the Inclusive Framework Meeting (2021), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000178-b389d098-a97a-f79960510001 (slide seven).
291 Id.
292 Saez & Zucman, supra note 67.
293 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L’ANCIEN RÉGIME ET LA RÉVOLUTION [THE OLD REGIME
AND THE REVOLUTION] (7th ed. 1866).
294 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
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Nevertheless, the new international tax regime envisaged in the two
Pillars in the Statement is also revolutionary. Pillar One (if implemented) will
partially remove the two main obstacles to taxing modern MNEs operating in
the digital economy, namely the physical presence requirement and the arm’slength standard. Pillar Two will fully implement the single tax principle on a
global level for the first time through strengthening both source and residence
taxation with various secondary corrective measures. It will raise significant
revenue for the participating countries, stop tax competition, and reduce base
erosion and profit shifting. However, the proposed global minimum tax rate
of fifteen percent would be lower than the average G20 corporate tax rate,
and substance carve-outs would maintain some double non-taxation.
Additionally, it may disproportionately harm developing countries more than
developed countries.
However, these flaws in Pillar Two could be eliminated based on the
outcome of current negotiations in the United States over reforming GILTI.
The U.S. GILTI rule, together with BEAT, has been grandfathered as
fulfilling the IIR and UTPR of Pillar Two. President Biden has proposed
raising the GILTI rate to twenty-one percent and eliminating the participation
exemption. Also, the President has proposed replacing BEAT with Stopping
Harmful Inversions and Ending Low-Tax Developments (“SHIELD”), which
is designed explicitly to fit the UTPR of Pillar Two, because it imposes
withholding tax on U.S. source income only if there is not adequate taxation
at the residence country.296 Unfortunately, the BBB Act did not incorporate
all of the President’s proposals. If, however, the United States adopts these
reforms, it is likely to generate a race to the “top” as other countries follow
suit, especially since SHIELD will put pressure on residence countries to
adopt the IIR.297
Overall, Pillar Two promises to finally break the back of tax competition
by implementing the single tax principle harmoniously. Successful
implementation of Pillar Two should enable both developed and developing
countries to maintain free trade and globalization while also retaining and
strengthening the social safety net from the added revenues extracted from
the world’s largest corporations. We should all hope that in the face of the
pressures of de-globalization and rising nationalism, the new international tax
regime seeking tax harmony will survive and enable all countries to overcome
tax competition and maintain a robust social safety net for their citizens.

296 Stopping Harmful Inversions and Ending Low-Tax Developments (“SHIELD”)
would deny corporate deductions by reference to payments to foreign related persons that are
subject to a low effective tax rate, unless the income is subject to an acceptable minimum tax
regime. SHIELD is intended to more effectively target profit shifting to low-taxed jurisdictions
compared to BEAT, while simultaneously providing a strong incentive for other nations to enact
global minimum tax regimes. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE MADE IN AMERICA TAX
PLAN
11–12
(2021),
http://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf.
297 A similar race to the top occurred when the United States adopted the CFC rules in
the 1960s, followed by over thirty other countries, including most of the G20. Reuven S. AviYonah, Constructive Unilateralism: U.S. Leadership and International Taxation, 42 INT’L TAX
J. 17 (2016).

47

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4102332

47

